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Three Dogmas of Response-Dependence

Philosophical Studies 123 (3):175-211 (2005)

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Response‐dependence and normativity.Yifan Sun - 2022 - Theoria 88 (6):1128-1143.details A non‐normative, response‐dependent view about morality can avoid metaphysical extravagance and explain why the extension of some non‐normative concepts can non‐accidentally match the extension of moral concepts. These features make it a plausible reductive account of moral properties. However, some philosophers believe that a response‐dependent account of morality must contain an irreducibly normative component. I argue that it is impossible to defend such a position while retaining the response‐dependent nature of morality in the ordinary sense. However, I believe that philosophers' (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Practices and the Direct Perception of Normative States.Julie Zahle - 2013 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 43 (4):493-518.details The overall aim of this two-part article is to provide a supplement to ability theories of practice in terms of a defense of the following thesis: In situations of social interaction, individuals’ ability to act appropriately sometimes depends on their exercise of the ability directly to perceive normative states. In this Part I, I introduce ability theories of practice and motivate my thesis. Furthermore, I offer an analysis of normative states as response-dependent properties. Last, I work out and defend an (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Humanity, virtue, justice: a framework for a capability approach.Benjamin James Bessey - unknowndetails This Thesis reconsiders the prospects for an approach to global justice centring on the proposal that every human being should possess a certain bundle of goods, which would include certain members of a distinctive category: the category of capabilities. My overall aim is to present a clarified and well-developed framework, within which such claims can be made. To do this, I visit a number of regions of normative and metanormative theorising. I begin by introducing the motivations for the capability approach, (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Aristotle's Cognitive Science: Belief, Affect and Rationality.Ian Mccready-Flora - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):394-435.details I offer a novel interpretation of Aristotle's psychology and notion of rationality, which draws the line between animal and specifically human cognition. Aristotle distinguishes belief (doxa), a form of rational cognition, from imagining (phantasia), which is shared with non-rational animals. We are, he says, “immediately affected” by beliefs, but respond to imagining “as if we were looking at a picture.” Aristotle's argument has been misunderstood; my interpretation explains and motivates it. Rationality includes a filter that interrupts the pathways between cognition (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 5 citations
Shallow versus deep response-dependence.Andrew William Howat - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):155-172.details This paper explores a distinction between two types of response- dependence (RD) account (shallow vs. deep). This distinction is inherent in much of the existing literature, however it is neither widely nor well understood, and has never been drawn explicitly. The distinction is often taken to be a metaphysical, or ‘realism-relevant’ one—i.e. deep RD accounts entail qualified realism (or perhaps anti-realism), while shallow RD accounts are metaphysically neutral. I argue that the distinction is not reliably realism-relevant. I formulate a weaker (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation

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