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  1. Aligning Innovation and Ethics: An Approach to Responsible Innovation Based on Preference Learning.Johann Jakob Häußermann & Fabian Schroth - 2020 - Philosophy of Management 19 (3):349-364.
    New technologies not only contribute greatly to society and the economy; they also involve fundamental societal shifts, challenging our values and ideas about ourselves and the world. With a view to aligning technological change and innovation with ethical values, the concept of responsible innovation advocates the inclusion of a variety of stakeholders, in particular from society. In shifting moral responsibility towards the producers of innovations, responsible innovation rejects the standard normative economic view that the ethical evaluation of innovations is a (...)
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  • Nudging and Participation: A Contractualist Approach to Behavioural Policy.Johann Jakob Häußermann - 2020 - Philosophy of Management 19 (1):45-68.
    As behavioural economics reveals, human decision-making deviates from neoclassical assumptions about human behaviour and people fail to make the ‘right’ welfare-enhancing choice. The purpose of Sunstein and Thaler’s concept of ‘nudge’ is to improve individual welfare. To provide normative justification, they argue that the only relevant normative criterion is whether the individual is ‘better off as judged by themselves’, so that the direction in which people are to be nudged is defined by their own preferences. In light of behavioural findings, (...)
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  • Climate Policy When Preferences Are Endogenous—and Sometimes They Are.Linus Mattauch & Cameron Hepburn - 2016 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 40 (1):76-95.
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  • Mindreading and Endogenous Beliefs in Games.Lauren Larrouy & Guilhem Lecouteux - 2017 - Journal of Economic Methodology 24 (3):318-343.
    We argue that a Bayesian explanation of strategic choices in games requires introducing a psychological theory of belief formation. We highlight that beliefs in epistemic game theory are derived from the actual choice of the players, and cannot therefore explain why Bayesian rational players should play the strategy they actually chose. We introduce the players’ capacity of mindreading in a game theoretical framework with the simulation theory, and characterise the beliefs that Bayes rational players could endogenously form in games. We (...)
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