According to the Feigl–Reichenbach–Salmon–Schurz pragmatic justification of induction, no predictive method is guaranteed or even likely to work for predicting the future; but if anything will work, induction will work—at least when induction is employed at the meta-level of predictive methods in light of their track records. One entertains a priori all manner of esoteric prediction methods, and is said to arrive a posteriori at the conclusion, based on the actual past, that object-level induction is optimal. Schurz’s refinements largely solve (...) the notorious short-run problem. A difficulty is noted, however, related to short-run worries but based on localized disagreement about the past, a feature characteristic of real debates (especially early modern) involving induction in intellectual history. Given the evidence about past events, _unfiltered by induction_, meta-induction might support a partly non-inductive method—especially as judged by proponents of esoteric prediction methods, who presumably believe that their methods have worked. Thus induction is justified meta-inductively in contexts where it was uncontroversial, while not obviously justified in key contexts where it has been disputed. This objection, momentarily sensed by Reichenbach regarding clairvoyance, is borne out by the Stoics’ use of meta-induction to justify both science and divination and by ancient Hebrew examples of meta-induction. Schurz’s recently introduced criteria for acceptance of testimony play a crucial role in arriving at object-level induction using meta-induction, but one might question them. Given the need for judgment in accepting testimony, it is unclear that the subjectivity of Howson’s Bayesian answer to Hume’s problem is overcome. (shrink)