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The Structure of Dialectic in the Meno

Phronesis 46 (4):413 - 439 (2001)

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  1. Signification, Essence, and Meno's Paradox: A Reply to David Charles's 'Types of Definition in the Meno'.Gail Fine - 2010 - Phronesis 55 (2):125-152.
    According to David Charles, in the Meno Socrates fleetingly distinguishes the signification from the essence question, but, in the end, he conflates them. Doing so, Charles thinks, both leads to Meno's paradox and prevents Socrates from answering it satisfactorily. I argue that Socrates doesn't conflate the two questions, and that his reply to Meno's paradox is more satisfactory than Charles allows.
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  • Recollection and Philosophical Reflection in Plato's Phaedo.Lee Franklin - 2005 - Phronesis 50 (4):289-314.
    Interpretations of recollection in the "Phaedo" are divided between ordinary interpretations, on which recollection explains a kind of learning accomplished by all, and sophisticated interpretations, which restrict recollection to philosophers. A sophisticated interpretation is supported by the prominence of philosophical understanding and reflection in the argument. Recollection is supposed to explain the advanced understanding displayed by Socrates and Simmias (74b2-4). Furthermore, it seems to be a necessary condition on recollection that one who recollects also perform a comparison of sensible particulars (...)
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  • Signification, Essence, and Meno’s Paradox: A Reply to David Charles’s ‘Types of Definition in the Meno’.Gail Fine - 2010 - Phronesis 55 (2):125-152.
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  • The Origins of Dialectic in Ordinary Discourse.Lee Franklin - 2016 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 19 (1):88-104.
    The opening discussion of the Meno features a halting conversation in which Meno struggles at length to answer Socrates’ question, “What is Virtue?” Whereas Socrates demands a unitary account, presenting Virtue as one, Meno repeatedly speaks of Virtue in plurality. Through the opposing sides of this conflict, Plato highlights impediments that appear to prevent ordinary speakers from inquiring into nature. These include the fallibility of ordinary beliefs and statements, and the inability of ordinary speakers to countenance properties as entities in (...)
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