Against my interpretation, Brian Leftow argues that Anselm of Canterbury held a presentist theory of time, and that presentism can be reconciled with Anselm’s commitments concerning divine omnipotence and omniscience. I respond, focusing mainly on two issues. First, it is difficult to understand the presentist theory which Leftow attributes to Anselm. I articulate my puzzlement in a way that I hope moves the discussion forward. Second, Leftow’s examples to demonstrate that presentism can be reconciled with Anselm’s understanding of the divine (...) nature assume a mode of divine knowing which is different from what Anselm proposes. I stand by my interpretation. (shrink)

Saint Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109) was the outstanding Christian philosopher and theologian of the eleventh century. He is best known for the celebrated “ontological argument” for the existence of God in chapter two of the Proslogion, but his contributions to philosophical theology (and indeed to philosophy more generally) go well beyond the ontological argument. In what follows I examine Anselm's theistic proofs, his conception of the divine nature, and his account of human freedom, sin, and redemption.

There is an objection to divine timelessness which claims that timelessness shouldn’t be adopted since on this view evil is never “destroyed,” “vanquished,” “eradicated” or defeated. By contrast, some divine temporalists think that presentism is the key that allows evil to be destroyed/vanquished/eradicated/defeated. However, since presentism is often considered to be inconsistent with timelessness, it is thought that the presentist solution is not available for defenders of timelessness. In this paper I first show how divine timelessness is consistent with a (...) presentist view of time and then how defenders of Presentist-Timelessness can adopt the presentist solution to the removal of evil. After this, I conclude the paper by showing that it’s far from clear that the presentist solution is successful and that unless one weakens what is meant by the destruction/vanquishing/eradication/defeat of evil, one can only make the presentist solution work by adopting a number of additional assumptions that many will find unattractive. (shrink)

In the eleventh book of the Confessiones Augustine puts forward several considerations about the nature of time. The received view is that he held that only the present exists, while the past and the future do not exist. This received view has recently been attacked by Paul Helm and Katherin Rogers, who have offered alternative interpretations according to which Augustine held that the present has no privileged ontological status, and that past, present and future all equally exist. The aim of (...) this paper is to defend the received view vis-à-vis these attacks. I argue that the received view fits best Augustine’s view of God’s eternity and relation to time and should therefore be preferred. (shrink)