There are various entities which, if they exist, would be candidates for necessary beings: God, propositions, relations, properties, states of affairs, possible worlds, and numbers, among others. Note that the first entity in this list is a concrete entity , while the rest are abstract entities. Many interesting philosophical questions arise when one inquires about necessary beings: What makes it the case that they exist necessarily? Is there a grounding for their necessary existence? Do some of them depend on others? (...) If so, how might one understand the dependence relation? (shrink)

This article provides an explanation of Anselm’s understanding of necessity. Anselm did not write much about modality, and what he did write is puzzling. The dominant readings of Anselm see him as having two concepts of necessity, one merely physical or causal, the other logical or “alethic.” This article argues that Anselm has just one concept of necessity, which corresponds best to what is now called broadly logical or absolute necessity, but whose metaphysics is in terms of powers and lacks (...) of power. The rival interpretations of A. D. Smith, Thomas Williams, and Sandra Visser are discussed and criticized in detail. (shrink)

This dissertation explores various attempts to solve the Dependence Problem problem posed by the following question: How can necessary truths stand to God in a one-way relation of dependence, given that neither they nor God could have failed to exist?

This thesis was on how God is related to the truth-values of propositions on possible worlds - specifically, those propositions that do not seem to be about Him and constitute His ideas for what to create. It opened with a survey of some historical positions with special emphasis on Aquinas, Leibniz, Spinoza and Kant. Next, some criticisms were given for these so-called deity theories with the most space given to Brian Leftow’s critiques. The second chapter detailed Brian Leftow’s theological modality. (...) In it, secular modality is excogitated in an instant from eternity when God gets a set of creaturely natures in one imaginative act. His preferences that are based on His nature then determine the modality of what God thinks up. A number of objections were raised for the Leftowian project and the last chapter attempted to supplement an older deity theory with some insights from Leftow in order to avoid his initial criticisms. (shrink)