Despite some notable similarities between the scientific realisms of Sellars and Peirce (such as both being anti-representationalist, and future-directed), in his mature work Science and Metaphysics Sellars explicitly critiqued Peirce’s account of truth, as lacking “an intelligible foundation” (Sellars 1968: vii). In this paper, I explore Sellars’ proposed remedy to Peirce’s purported lack, in his complex and enigmatic account of picturing – a non-discursive ‘mapping’ of the world. I argue that although Sellars’ development of this idea is largely sound, much (...) of what he charges Peirce’s philosophy with missing is actually present there. By means of his semiotic icon / index / symbol distinction, Peirce manages to develop a philosophy of language which effectively coordinates the real order and the order of signification within the very structure of the proposition as he understands it, by contrast to Sellars’ claim that the two orders are merely connected by ‘analogy’. I also argue that in between Sellars’ ambitious account of veridicality, which appears to anticipate a form of scientific self-mensuration, and the dismissive ‘anti-truth’ quietism of neopragmatists such as Rorty, Peirce’s “contrite fallibilism” (Peirce CP 1.14) charts a wise middle path. (shrink)