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The Open Body

In Antonella Carassa, Francesca Morganti & Guiseppa Riva (eds.), Enacting Intersubjectivity: Paving the Way for a Dialogue Between Cognitive Science, Social Cognition, and Neuroscience. Universita della Svizzera Italiana. pp. 109-128 (2009)

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  1. Empathy, enaction, and shared musical experience.Joel Krueger - 2013 - In Tom Cochrane, Bernardino Fantini & Klaus R. Scherer (eds.), The Emotional Power of Music: Multidisciplinary perspectives on musical arousal, expression, and social control. Oxford University Press. pp. 177-196.
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  • At home in and beyond our skin: Posthuman embodiment in film and television.Joel Krueger - 2015 - In Hauskeller Michael, Carbonell Curtis D. & Philbeck Thomas D. (eds.), Handbook of Posthumanism in Film and Television. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 172-181.
    Film and television portrayals of posthuman cyborgs melding biology and technology, simultaneously “animal and machine” abound. Most of us immediately think of iconic characters like Arnold Schwarzenegger’s relentless cyborg assassin in the Terminator series or Peter Weller’s crime-fighting cyborg police officer in Robocop (1987). Or perhaps we recall the many cyborgs populating the Dr. Who, Star Trek, and Star Wars television series and films—including Darth Vader, surely the most famous cinematic cyborg of all time. But lesser-known explorations of cybernetic embodiment (...)
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  • More than our Body: Minimal and Enactive Selfhood in Global Paralysis.Miriam Kyselo - 2019 - Neuroethics 13 (2):203-220.
    This paper looks to phenomenology and enactive cognition in order to shed light on the self and sense of self of patients with locked-in syndrome. It critically discusses the concept of the minimal self, both in its phenomenological and ontological dimension. Ontologically speaking, the self is considered to be equal to a person’s sensorimotor embodiment. This bodily self also grounds the minimal sense of self as being a distinct experiential subject. The view from the minimal bodily self presupposes that sociality (...)
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