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  1. From Neuroscience to Law: Bridging the Gap.Tuomas K. Pernu & Nadine Elzein - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
    Since our moral and legal judgments are focused on our decisions and actions, one would expect information about the neural underpinnings of human decision-making and action-production to have a significant bearing on those judgments. However, despite the wealth of empirical data, and the public attention it has attracted in the past few decades, the results of neuroscientific research have had relatively little influence on legal practice. It is here argued that this is due, at least partly, to the discussion on (...)
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  • Arguing about causes in law: a semi-formal framework for causal arguments.Rūta Liepiņa, Giovanni Sartor & Adam Wyner - 2020 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 28 (1):69-89.
    Disputes over causes play a central role in legal argumentation and liability attribution. Legal approaches to causation often struggle to capture cause-in-fact in complex situations, e.g. overdetermination, preemption, omission. In this paper, we first assess three current theories of causation to illustrate their strengths and weaknesses in capturing cause-in-fact. Secondly, we introduce a semi-formal framework for modelling causal arguments through strict and defeasible rules. Thirdly, the framework is applied to the Althen vaccine injury case. And lastly, we discuss the need (...)
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  • Arguing about causes in law: a semi-formal framework for causal arguments.Rūta Liepiņa, Giovanni Sartor & Adam Wyner - 2020 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 28 (1):69-89.
    Disputes over causes play a central role in legal argumentation and liability attribution. Legal approaches to causation often struggle to capture cause-in-fact in complex situations, e.g. overdetermination, preemption, omission. In this paper, we first assess three current theories of causation to illustrate their strengths and weaknesses in capturing cause-in-fact. Secondly, we introduce a semi-formal framework for modelling causal arguments through strict and defeasible rules. Thirdly, the framework is applied to the Althen vaccine injury case. And lastly, we discuss the need (...)
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  • Arguing about causes in law: a semi-formal framework for causal arguments.Rūta Liepiņa, Giovanni Sartor & Adam Wyner - 2020 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 28 (1):69-89.
    Disputes over causes play a central role in legal argumentation and liability attribution. Legal approaches to causation often struggle to capture cause-in-fact in complex situations, e.g. overdetermination, preemption, omission. In this paper, we first assess three current theories of causation to illustrate their strengths and weaknesses in capturing cause-in-fact. Secondly, we introduce a semi-formal framework for modelling causal arguments through strict and defeasible rules. Thirdly, the framework is applied to the Althen vaccine injury case. And lastly, we discuss the need (...)
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  • Commonsense causal explanation in a legal domain.Rinke Hoekstra & Joost Breuker - 2007 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 15 (3):281-299.
    In this paper, we present an approach to commonsense causal explanation of stories that can be used for automatically determining the liable party in legal case descriptions. The approach is based on, a core ontology for law that takes a commonsense perspective. Aside from our thesis that in the legal domain many terms still have a strong commonsense flavour, the descriptions of events in legal cases, as e.g. presented at judicial trials, are cast in commonsense terms as well. We present (...)
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  • Norms and plans as unification criteria for social collectives.Aldo Gangemi - 2008 - Journal of Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 16 (3).
    Based on the paradigm of Constructive Descriptions and Situations, we introduce NIC, an ontology of social collectives that includes social agents, plans, norms, and the conceptual relations between them. Norms are distinguished from plans, and their relations are formalized. A typology of social collectives is also proposed, including collection of agents, knowledge community, intentional collective, and normative intentional collective. NIC, represented as a first-order theory as well as a description logic for applications requiring automated reasoning, provides the expressivity to talk (...)
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