This paper is divided into three sections. The purpose of the first section is to show how the search for an alternative conception of practical normativity by contemporary moral philosophers keeps affinities with Nietzsche's attempt to overcome morality in the nineteenth century. In the second section, I assess the merits and limitations of Brobjer's attempt to affiliate Nietzsche with the ancient Greek tradition of virtue ethics. In the third section, I present the different motivations behind Nietzsche's critique of the moral (...) conception of practical normativity. I claim that this diversity of motivations makes his position unstable and helps us to explain why he oscillates between the consequentialist and the non-consequentialist view of perfectionism. Although I do not discuss it exhaustively in this paper, I point out some reasons why Nietzsche should have advocated a non-consequentialist view of perfectionism. (shrink)

The continued presence and importance of Christian moral values in our daily lives, coupled with the fact that faith in Christianity is in continual decline, raises the question as to why having lost faith in Christianity, we have also not lost faith in our Christian moral values. This question is also indicative of a more pressing phenomenon: not only have we maintained our faith in Christian values, we fail to see that the widespread collapse of Christianity should affect this faith. (...) To tackle this latter phenomenon, I claim, we have to pose the Nietzschean question of the value of our moral values, so as to see that this value can be a possible object of questioning. In chapter one, I consider different approaches found in the history of moral philosophy that look like potential candidates for this task. I argue that, ultimately, the task requires simultaneously taking our familiarity with Christian moral values as both sui generis and a questionable phenomenon. In chapter two, I articulate in detail the sui generis nature of this familiarity with moral values,in terms of the phenomena of habituation and sedimentation. In chapter three, I consider the possibility of estrangement that is built into our familiarity with moral values, by focusing on the role of cognition. I demonstrate how cognition, in the form of self-consciousness, can disrupt the sedimented, habituated nature of our moral values through a form of ironic disruption. In chapter four, I develop this account by considering the possibility of an appeal to an alternative moral outlook. To do so, I draw upon the structural isomorphism that is present between the process of estrangement and a rite of passage. (shrink)

Resumo Este artigo examina brevemente algumas tentativas de reconstruir o que seria a contrapartida “positiva” da crítica de Nietzsche à moralidade, ou seja, o tipo de engajamento normativo que fundamentaria seu ataque à moral. Essas reconstruções têm atribuído a Nietzsche diferentes compromissos normativos, de modo que ele está próximo ora de um esteticismo, ora de algum tipo de utilitarismo, ora de uma ética das virtudes. Destacamos alguns pontos que são relevantes para a filosofia de Nietzsche e que parecem estar em (...) dissonância com tais reconstruções. Estes pontos referem-se às concepções nietzschianas de perspectivismo, egoísmo, liberdade, Rausch e seu autodeclarado “imoralismo”. O objetivo é avaliar em que medida essas reconstruções são capazes de capturar o que há de singular no que Nietzsche tem a nos dizer sobre ética e normatividade prática sem descuidar de certos compromissos essenciais de sua filosofia.This article discusses some attempts of reconstructing the “positive” counterpart of Nietzsche’s critique of morality, that is, attempts of answering the question of what would be a properly Nietzschean ethics or normativity, which is supposed to ground his attacks on morals. Such reconstructions have attributed different normative commitments to Nietzsche, so that his positive views on ethics might be described either as a form of aestheticism or as a heterodox version of utilitarianism or even as a variety of virtue ethics. We point out some features of the Nietzschean philosophy that seem to be relevant though not consonant with such reconstructions, points related to his conceptions of perspectivism, egoism, freedom and Rausch as well as his self-proclaimed “immoralism”, in order to assess the appropriateness of such reconstructions to capture Nietzsche’s positive views on ethics and practical normativity. (shrink)