G. F. Stout is famous as an early twentieth century proselyte for abstract particulars, or tropes as they are now often called. He advanced his version of trope theory to avoid the excesses of nominalism on the one hand and realism on the other. But his arguments for tropes have been widely misconceived as metaphysical, e.g. by Armstrong. In this paper, I argue that Stout’s fundamental arguments for tropes were ideological and epistemological rather than metaphysical. He moulded his scheme to (...) fit what is actually given to us in perception, arguing that our epistemic practices would break down in an environment where only universals were given to us. (shrink)

This paper consists of two parts. Part I contains a precise model-theoretic reconstruction of Quine's criterion for the ontological presuppositions of a theory. Two versions (K1), (K2) of the criterion are elaborated, (K2) being the more adequate one which is shown through a number of theorems for each version. Part II contains a critical discussion of (K2), in particular of the question wether (K2) is a criterion for ontological presuppositions, i.e. for entities existing independently of the theory. Its answer depends (...) on the meaning of the quantifiers used in (K2). It is shown that this meaning, contrary to Quine's opinion, does not commit one to the existence of entities. Quine's criterion is therefore not a criterion for ontological presuppositions of theories. If theories at all presuppose independently existing entities, then it is not by using the standard quantifiers of classical logic. One of the consequences of this result is that there is no need for a free logic, which is shown by discussing a system of Lambert and Meyer. Another consequence is that there is no problem about negative existentials. (shrink)

Quine claimed that to be is is to be a value of a bound variable. In the paper we assume that this claim contains an important philosophical insight and investigate its background. It is argued that there are two dimensions involved in Quine’s slogan: (i) the distinction between existing and non-existing objects and (ii) the question of the systematic ambiguity of being that can be traced back to Aristotle. At the first sight it is tempting to construe Quine’s criterion according (...) to the first dimension. In this light it appears as an anti-Meinongian device and the Russelian roots of Quine’s philosophy make this interpretation prima facie plausible. However, it is argued that it is the anti-Aristotelian line which is dominant in Quine’s philosophy, and which is ontologically much more interesting. (shrink)