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  1. Lemos on the Physical Indeterminism Luck Objection.Dwayne Moore - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (3):1459-1477.
    I recently argued that reductive physicalist versions of libertarian free will face a physical indeterminism luck objection. John Lemos claims that one potential advocate of reductive physicalist libertarianism, Robert Kane, avoids this physical indeterminism luck objection. I here show how the problem remains.
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  • Quausation and the Physical Indeterminism Luck Objection: a Reply to Moore.Neil Campbell - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (3):1129-1142.
    Dwayne Moore raises the physical indeterminism luck objection to libertarian theories of free will, which claims that because agents lack control over the indeterministic physical processes that cause choices, agents lack control over those choices. Moore considers the libertarian strategy of identifying these processes with agential states, such as efforts of will, in order to secure agential control over the outcome of these processes. According to Moore, this strategy faces an insurmountable obstacle in the form of a quausation problem. He (...)
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  • Free Will Skepticism, Quarantine, and Corrections.John Lemos - 2024 - Diametros 21 (79):107-118.
    This article compares the quarantine model of criminal justice advocated by Derk Pereboom and Gregg Caruso with the corrections model of criminal justice advocated by Michael Corrado. Both of these theories are grounded on the presumption that persons lack desert-grounding free will. It is argued that on this presumption there is no reason to believe that Michael Corrado’s corrections model is any better than the quarantine model.
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