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  1. The Argument from Nominal–Notable Comparisons, ‘Ought All Things Considered’, and Normative Pluralism.Mathea Slåttholm Sagdahl - 2014 - The Journal of Ethics 18 (4):405-425.
    The idea that morality and prudence are incommensurable normative domains—a central idea in normative pluralism—tends to be rejected because of the argument from nominal–notable comparisons. The argument relies on a premise that there are situations of moral–prudential conflict where we have a clear intuition that there are things we ought to do “all things considered”. It is usually concluded that this shows that morality and prudence must be comparable. I argue that normative pluralists, who defend this type of incommensurability, can (...)
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