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Wanting, Willing, Trying and Kane's Theory of Free Will

Dialectica 65 (1):31-48 (2011)

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Self-forming actions, contrastive explanations, and the structure of the will.Neil Campbell - 2020 - Synthese 197 (3):1225-1240.details Robert Kane’s libertarian theory is often attacked on the grounds that undetermined self-forming actions are not amenable to contrastive explanation. I propose that we should understand contrastive explanations in terms of an appeal to structuring causes. Doing so reveals that Kane’s claim that there can be no contrastive explanation for self-forming actions is not an unwanted implication of his appeal to indeterminism, but is actually an implication of the fact that the agent’s will is not yet appropriately structured. I then (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
Free Will Skepticism, Quarantine, and Corrections.John Lemos - 2024 - Diametros 21 (79):107-118.details This article compares the quarantine model of criminal justice advocated by Derk Pereboom and Gregg Caruso with the corrections model of criminal justice advocated by Michael Corrado. Both of these theories are grounded on the presumption that persons lack desert-grounding free will. It is argued that on this presumption there is no reason to believe that Michael Corrado’s corrections model is any better than the quarantine model. Download Export citation Bookmark
Self-Forming Acts and the Grounds of Responsibility.John Lemos - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (1):135-146.details Robert Kane has for many years claimed that in our underivatively free actions, what he calls “self-forming acts”, we actually try to do both of the two acts we are contemplating doing and then we ultimately end up doing only one of them. This idea of dual willings/efforts was put forward in an attempt to solve luck problems, but Randolph Clarke and Alfred Mele argue that for this to work agents must, then, freely engage in the dual efforts leading up (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 4 citations
Undetermined Choices, Luck and the Enhancement Problem.Nadine Elzein - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (7):2827-2846.details If indeterminism is to be necessary for moral responsibility, we must show that it doesn’t preclude responsibility (the Luck Problem) and that it might enhance it (the Enhancement Problem). A ‘strong luck claim’ motivates the Luck Problem: if an agent’s choice is undetermined, then her mental life will be causally irrelevant to her choice, whichever way she decides. A ‘weak luck claim’ motivates the Enhancement Problem: if an agent’s choice is undetermined, then even if her mental life is causally relevant (...) Download Export citation Bookmark

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