Despite the plethora of freedom of religion literature (under section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), the corresponding literature on the freedom of conscience is minimal. To further the discussion on the freedom of conscience, I rely heavily on the philosophical literature to make an important distinction; the difference between individual- based and communal-based conceptions of conscience. Whereas the former is plagued with subjectivity, making it difficult to conceptualize a working framework for the Charter right, the latter (...) offers a promising foothold to rise above subjectivity and find a firm footing based on communal relations. In emphasizing the importance of the dialogical nature of human beings and the relational necessity undergirding moral judgements, I argue that the concept of conscience should be understood and practiced in community, rather than individually. (shrink)

According to the standard liberal egalitarian approach, religious exemptions from generally applicable laws can be justified on the grounds of equal respect for each citizen’s conscience. I contend that claims of conscience cannot justify demands for exemptions, since they do not meet even the most inclusive standards of public justification. Arguments of the form ‘My conscience says so’ do not explicate the rationale behind the practices that the claimants seek to protect. Therefore, such arguments do not constitute even pro tanto (...) reasons for exemptions. Rather, they are what Francis Bacon called idola fori – ‘idols of the marketplace’– conventional justifications that are deemed rational and even self- evident, while in fact they are not. (shrink)

According to Cécile Laborde, persons with religious commitments that are incidentally burdened by generally applicable laws should, under certain circumstances, be provided with an exemption from those laws. Labore’s justification for this view is that religious commitments are a type of commitment with which a person must comply if she is to maintain her integrity. I argue that Laborde´s account is insufficiently demanding in terms of the other-regarding attitudes it expects people to have before they can make claims to exemptions (...) based on their integrity. The reason for this is that Laborde’s account rests on what I call a ‘non-moralised’ view of integrity. I raise some criticisms of this view and defend an alternative, ‘moralised’ view of integrity, according to which a religious person’s integrity depends on whether the practice she wishes to perform complies with certain moral constraints. (shrink)