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  1. A Critique of Yablo’s If-thenism.Bradley Armour-Garb & Frederick Kroon - 2023 - Philosophia Mathematica 31 (3):360-371.
    Using ideas proposed in Aboutness and developed in ‘If-thenism’, Stephen Yablo has tried to improve on classical if-thenism in mathematics, a view initially put forward by Bertrand Russell in his Principles of Mathematics. Yablo’s stated goal is to provide a reading of a sentence like ‘The number of planets is eight’ with a sort of content on which it fails to imply ‘Numbers exist’. After presenting Yablo’s framework, our paper raises a problem with his view that has gone virtually unnoticed (...)
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  • Applied Mathematics without Numbers.Jack Himelright - 2023 - Philosophia Mathematica 31 (2):147-175.
    In this paper, I develop a "safety result" for applied mathematics. I show that whenever a theory in natural science entails some non-mathematical conclusion via an application of mathematics, there is a counterpart theory that carries no commitment to mathematical objects, entails the same conclusion, and the claims of which are true if the claims of the original theory are "correct": roughly, true given the assumption that mathematical objects exist. The framework used for proving the safety result has some advantages (...)
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  • Mathematical surrealism as an alternative to easy-road fictionalism.Kenneth Boyce - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):2815-2835.
    Easy-road mathematical fictionalists grant for the sake of argument that quantification over mathematical entities is indispensable to some of our best scientific theories and explanations. Even so they maintain we can accept those theories and explanations, without believing their mathematical components, provided we believe the concrete world is intrinsically as it needs to be for those components to be true. Those I refer to as “mathematical surrealists” by contrast appeal to facts about the intrinsic character of the concrete world, not (...)
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  • Hartry Field. Science Without Numbers: A Defense of Nominalism 2nd ed. [REVIEW]Geoffrey Hellman & Mary Leng - 2019 - Philosophia Mathematica 27 (1):139-148.
    FieldHartry. Science Without Numbers: A Defense of Nominalism 2nd ed.Oxford University Press, 2016. ISBN 978-0-19-877792-2. Pp. vi + 56 + vi + 111.
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  • The Problem of (Fully) Empty Predicates.Bradley Armour-Garb & Frederick Kroon - 2017 - Australasian Philosophical Review 1 (2):163-167.
    ABSTRACTIn our paper, we mount a novel argument, which trades on recent work by Roy Sorensen [2016], following work by Saul Kripke, against Yablo's preferred reading of if-thenism, which is an attempt to read problematically ontologically committing sentences in a way that does not carry such ontological commitments. Although our argument is directed at Yablo's proposed reading of if-thenism, if the argument is successful, other versions of if-thenism may be affected. After reviewing Sorensen's recent work and presenting our argument, we (...)
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  • The Limits of Subtraction.Mark Colyvan - 2017 - Australasian Philosophical Review 1 (2):168-172.
    ABSTRACTIn the target article ‘If-Thenism’, Stephen Yablo develops a novel form of if-thenism, that appeals to the notion of logical subtraction. In this commentary, I explore the limits of Yablo's proposed subtraction procedure, by leaning on an analogy with photographic subtraction. In particular, I will argue that there will be cases when there's nothing interesting left after the subtraction and, as a consequence, there are serious limits to the applicability of the subtraction procedure.
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  • If-Thenism—A Nominalistic Account of Talk About Abstracta?Katharina Felka - 2017 - Australasian Philosophical Review 1 (2):179-183.
    ABSTRACTAccording to Yablo, in uttering sentences that imply the existence of abstract objects, we do not assert their literal content. Instead, we only make a weaker conditional claim that does not have the controversial implication. In this commentary I argue that the conditional claims Yablo suggests we are making are true only if abstract objects exist and, thus, also carry the controversial implication.
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  • If-Thenism and Fictionalism.Seahwa Kim - 2017 - Australasian Philosophical Review 1 (2):189-195.
    ABSTRACTStandard theories treat A→C and A→D as equivalent when C and D coincide on A. However, Yablo's incremental conditional does not behave in this way. Consider the following: a = b→Fa. a = b→Fb.According to Yablo, the real content of is Fb and the real content of is Fa. In worlds where a = b is true, both and have the same truth-value. However, ‘Fa can come apart truth-value-wise from Fb in worlds where a isn't b.’ In this paper, I (...)
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