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On Names

In P. Leonardi & M. Santambrogio (eds.), On Quine. Cambridge University Press (1995)

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  1. The Property‐Theoretical, Performative‐Nominalistic Theory of Proper Names.Francesco Orilia - 2000 - Dialectica 54 (3):155-176.
    This paper embeds a theory of proper names in a general approach to singular reference based on type‐free property theory. It is proposed that a proper name “N” is a sortal common noun whose meaning is essentially tied to the linguistic type “N”. Moreover, “N” can be singularly referring insofar as it is elliptical for a definite description of the form the “N” Following Montague, the meaning of a definite description is taken to be a property of properties. The proposed (...)
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  • What is Communicative Success?Peter Pagin - 2008 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (1):pp. 85-115.
    Suppose we have an idea of what counts as communication, more precisely as a communicative event. Then we have the further task of dividing communicative events into successful and unsuccessful. Part of this task is to find a basis for this evaluation, i.e. appropriate properties of speaker and hearer. It is argued that success should be evaluated in terms of a relation between thought contents of speaker and hearer. This view is labelled ‘classical’, since it is justifiably attributable to both (...)
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  • In Memoriam: George Stephen Boolos 1940–1996.Warren Goldfarb - 1996 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 2 (4):444-447.
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  • La Publicité Et L’Interdépendance du Langage Et de la Pensée.Daniel Laurier - 2004 - Dialogue 43 (2):281-315.
    I clarify in what sense one might want to claim that thought or language are public. I distinguish among four forms that each of these claims might take, and two general ways of establishing them that might be contemplated. The first infers the public character of thought from the public character of language, and the second infers the latter from the former. I show that neither of these stategies seems to be able to dispense with the claim that thought and (...)
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