This paper embeds a theory of proper names in a general approach to singular reference based on type‐free property theory. It is proposed that a proper name “N” is a sortal common noun whose meaning is essentially tied to the linguistic type “N”. Moreover, “N” can be singularly referring insofar as it is elliptical for a definite description of the form the “N” Following Montague, the meaning of a definite description is taken to be a property of properties. The proposed (...) theory fulfils the major desiderata stemming from Kripke's works on proper names. (shrink)

Écrire un livre sur les fondements empiriques de la signification qui reprenne la question tant débattue de la critique de l'analycité, de la traduction radicale et de l'indétermination de la traduction, d'un point de vue éclairant, précis, et renouvelé à bien des égards, est la gageure que relève Martin Montminy avec son excellent livre Les fondements empiriques de la signification. La thèse simple mais convaincante de l'auteur est que la critique de l'analycité et de la distinction entre analytique et synthétique, (...) comme critique de toute approche normative de la signification, est la voie d'entrée, le fil directeur et l'argument central des différentes thèses de Quine sur l'épistémologie naturalisée, le holisme épistémologique et l'indétermination de la traduction. C'est par ce biais qu'il défend une approche empirique de la signification liant toute théorie sémantique à des données empiriques en principe accessibles à un observateur. Par ce fil directeur, Montminy, dans une argumentation toujours claire et explicite, offre à la fois une introduction pédagogique au. (shrink)

I clarify in what sense one might want to claim that thought or language are public. I distinguish among four forms that each of these claims might take, and two general ways of establishing them that might be contemplated. The first infers the public character of thought from the public character of language, and the second infers the latter from the former. I show that neither of these stategies seems to be able to dispense with the claim that thought and (...) language are interdependent, and that the second strategy raises more difficulties than the first. I then examine the reasoning by which Davidson means to establish that thought depends on language. I claim that this reasoning is not conclusive, and that it can be adapted in such a way as to establish a version of the thesis that thought is public which does not presuppose that language is public, and a version of the thesis that language is public which does not imply that thought depends on language. I conclude with the suggestion that despite appearances to the contrary Davidson's doctrine is defensible only if it implies at least the conceivability of intentional systems that would lack language altogether. (shrink)