Reflection on the self's way of being "in" consciousness yields two arguments for a theory of self-reference not based in any way all all on self-cognition. First, I show that one theory of self-reference predicts an experience of the self because the theory inadequately analyzes the semantical facts about indexicality. I construct a dilemma for this cognitivism, which it cannot get out of, for it requires even solitary self-reference to be based on some original self-knowledge, which is not available. I (...) describe my "kinetic model" of unspoken self-reference, and I show how it fits the facts of four forms of consciousness, all of which presuppose self-reference, rather than yield it. Second, a speaker uses the first person pronoun in sentences because she is aware of the unmediated role in agency of the beliefs she would express, and not because she is aware of herself in their content. The cognitive model, in contrast, succumbs to a vicious regress and is exposed as an obstacle to an understanding of consciousness. (shrink)

RésuméJ'examine dans cet article une notion assez spéciale de nécessité, celle de la nécessité matérielle, introduite explicitement pour la première fois par Adolf Reinach. Je soutiens que la variation libre joue un rôle important dans la découverte et la description de la nécessité matérielle et j'explore également quelques questions apparentées ayant trait à la présentation et à la signification, à la théorie des actes de discours, ainsi qu'à la qualité et à la matière de la présentation.