IntroductionPrevious studies on metacognitive ability were explored using self-report questionnaires that are difficult to adequately measure and evaluate when the capacity for self-reference is undeveloped. This study aimed to validate the Congruency-based Metacognition Scale to measure metacognition and the feeling of confidence abilities and to investigate the development of metacognition during adolescence.MethodsThe CMS was administered to 633 child–parent pairs in Japan. The CMS metacognition score was assessed based on congruency scores between the self-report of the child from a third-person perspective (...) and the parent’s report from the first-person perspective. The CMS self-judgment accuracy score was assessed by the congruency scores between the children’s self-report from the 1PP and 3PP. For both measures, the more distant the 3PP on the self-report was from the 1PP on the parent’s report and child self-report means low ability. An exploratory factor analysis was conducted to examine construct validity and then a confirmatory factor analysis was used. Criterion validity was examined by calculating Pearson’s correlation coefficients with scores on the Beck Cognitive Insight Scale and Autism Quotient. We used intraclass correlation and Cronbach’s alpha to examine the test–retest and internal consistency reliability.ResultsBased on the results of the EFA and CFA, we adopted one factor structure with five items. The CMS metacognition and CMS self-judgment accuracy showed evidence criterion validity, exhibiting significant correlations with the BCIS self-reflectiveness and self-certainty scores, respectively. Regarding to the AQ, only the CMS metacognition score had significant correlations with the social skills and total scale score. The test–retest reliability showed adequate. Adolescents were found to have significantly lower metacognitive ability compared to young adults.ConclusionCMS could be a valid and reliable measure to examine metacognitive abilities for adolescents. (shrink)

Intervening on causal systems can illuminate their underlying structures. Past work has shown that, relative to adults, young children often make intervention decisions that appear to confirm a single hypothesis rather than those that optimally discriminate alternative hypotheses. Here, we investigated how the ability to make informative causal interventions changes across development. Ninety participants between the ages of 7 and 25 completed 40 different puzzles in which they had to intervene on various causal systems to determine their underlying structures. Each (...) puzzle comprised a three‐ or four‐node computer chip with hidden wires. On each trial, participants viewed two possible arrangements of the chip's hidden wires and had to select a single node to activate. After observing the outcome of their intervention, participants selected a wire configuration and rated their confidence in their selection. We characterized participant choices with a Bayesian measurement model that indexed the extent to which participants selected nodes that would best disambiguate the two possible causal structures versus those that had high causal centrality in one of the two causal hypotheses but did not necessarily discriminate between them. Our model estimates revealed that the use of a discriminatory strategy increased through early adolescence. Further, developmental improvements in intervention strategy were related to changes in the ability to accurately judge the strength of evidence that interventions revealed, as indexed by participants' confidence in their selections. Our results suggest that improvements in causal information‐seeking extend into adolescence and may be driven by metacognitive sensitivity to the efficacy of previous interventions in discriminating competing ideas. (shrink)