The proper statement and assessment of Russell's theory depends on one's semantic presuppositions. A semantic framework is provided, and Russell's theory formulated in terms of it. Referential uses of descriptions raise familiar problems for the theory, to which there are, at the most general level of abstraction, two possible Russellian responses. Both are considered, and both found wanting. The paper ends with a brief consideration of what the correct positive theory of definite descriptions might be, if it is not the (...) Russellian theory. (shrink)

SummaryCarnap tried to overcome metaphysics through a distinction between empirical and conceptual truths. The distinction has since been challenged, but not on the basis of a systematic logical analysis of language. It is suggested here that the logical theory of identifiability based on the author's interrogative model will provide the tools for such a systematic analysis. As an example of what the model can do, a criticism is offered of Quine's and Chomsky's implicit assumption that language learning is based on (...) atomistic “answers” .RésuméCarnap a essayé de dépasser la métaphysique par une distinction entre des vérités empiriques et des vérités conceptuelles. Cette distinction a ensuite été contestée, mais non sur la base ?une analyse systematique du langage. On suggére ici que la théorie logique de ľidentifiabilité basée sur le modéle interrogatif de ľauteur fournira les outils ?une telle analyse systématique. Comme exemple de ce que peut faire ce modéle, on présente une critique de la supposition implicite de Quine et de Chomsky selon laquelle ľapprentissage du langage repose sur des ≫réponses≪ atomiques .ZusammenfassungCarnap versuchte Metaphysik durch eine Unterscheidung zwischen empirischen und konzep‐tuellen Wahrheiten zu iiberwinden. Seither wurde die Unterscheidung immer wieder angegriffen, jedoch nicht auf der Basis einer systematischen logischen Analyse der Sprache. In vorliegendem Artikel wird vorgeschlagen, dass eine logische Theorie der Identifizierbarkeit, welche auf dem Frage‐Antwort‐Modell des Autors grilndet, die Instrumente fur eine solche logische Analyse bereitstellt. Als Beispiel dafiir, was das Modell leisten kann, dient eine Kritik an Quines und Chomskys impliziter Voraussetzung, dass das Erlernen von Sprache auf atomaren ≫Antworten≪ aufbaut. (shrink)

The problem addressed is that of finding a sound characterization of ambiguity. Two kinds of characterizations are distinguished: tests and definitions. Various definitions of ambiguity are critically examined and contrasted with definitions of generality and indeterminacy, concepts with which ambiguity is sometimes confused. One definition of ambiguity is defended as being more theoretically adequate than others which have been suggested by both philosophers and linguists. It is also shown how this definition of ambiguity obviates a problem thought to be posed (...) by ambiguity for truth theoretical semantics. In addition, the best known test for ambiguity, namely the test by contradiction, is set out, its limitations discussed, and its connection with ambiguity's definition explained. The test is contrasted with a test for vagueness first proposed by Peirce and a test for generality propounded by Margalit. (shrink)

In this paper, after having outlined the theoretical framework of Brandom’s philosophy, I examine his attempt to reconcile semantic perspectivism, which is at the core of his inferentialist semantics, with the idea that objectivity transcends the practical normative attitudes of the participants in the so-called game of giving and asking for reasons.