A temporal levels structure for temporal metaphysics is outlined and employed to convey a dilemma threatening the temporal collapse of Growing-Block Theories to their meta-temporal level. The outline further explains how Presentism occupies a privileged position in that temporal levels structure. Moreover, that dilemma relies crucially on the acceptance of productive causation as explaining additions to the growing block, for which it is argued any reasonable growing-block theory should incorporate. The dilemma’s first horn considers growing-block theories where productive causes are (...) only so when present; the second, growing-block theories where productive causes continue being so when past. Either way, growing-block theory collapses into Accruing-Present Theory: whereby all entities survive into succeeding present “blocks” of existents. It is argued, the presentness of surviving entities undermines their intended theoretical role, undercutting motivations for believing accruing-present theses. Ultimately, I recommend rejection of both growing-block and accruing-present theses based on these explanatory inadequacies. (shrink)

This paper elaborates the problem of temporal unity for dynamic presentism and diagnoses the source of that problem in the dynamic presentist’s discarding the traditional C-series in its avoidance of McTaggart’s (1908, 1927) A-series paradox. This C-series provided the fixed structure of time which the transitory aspects of time then followed, and thereby unify those transitory aspects. It then considers ersatzer presentism as an ostensible solution to the problem of temporal unity by providing a new abstract C-series (namely an ersatz-B-series) (...) for dynamic presentism. However, after a closer examination of the details of this proposal, it is found that the ersatz-B-series itself needs to be temporally variable to capture the transitory aspects of time that it is meant to track. Consequently, it cannot provide the fixed structure of time required to unify the transitory aspects of time into a temporal series. It is therefore suggested that dynamic presentists look for a more course-grained determiner of temporal progression to construct the presentist-friendly C-series required to unify their transitory aspects of time. (shrink)

This essay outlines an explanatory virtue of presentism: its unique ability amongst temporal metaphysics to deliver a partial explanation of the conservational character of natural laws. That explanation relies on presentism, uniquely amongst temporal metaphysics, being able to support an endurantist account of persistence. In particular, after reconsidering a former argument for endurantism entailing presentism by Merricks (Noûs 33:421-438, 1999), a new argument for this entailment, is expounded. Before delivering the explanation of the conservational character of natural laws, a brief (...) account of that explanandum is given, followed by an elaboration of the wider significance of an explanation for the conservational character for natural laws, particularly for the dispositional essentialist project of nomic reductionism, and explaining the non-simultaneity of causation. (shrink)

This paper considers a problem for dynamic presentism that has received little attention: its apparent inability to accommodate the duration of events (such as conscious experiences). After outlining the problem, I defend presentism from it. This defence proceeds in two stages. First, I argue the objection rests on a faulty assumption: that duration is temporal extension. The paper challenges that assumption on several different ways of conceiving of temporal extension. This is the negative case and forms the bulk of the (...) paper. Second, after diagnosing the error leading to the identification of duration with temporal extension, I outline a new presentist-friendly account of duration that avoids the problem. In particular, a non-reductive account of duration is offered that treats it as a primitive quality which bestows its possessor with a certain modal quality: that the possessor potentially does not change whilst there are changes in its environs. This is the positive case. Together the positive and negative cases provide presentism with an interesting and novel way of overcoming the problem of duration. (shrink)

This essay outlines an explanatory virtue of presentism: its unique ability amongst temporal metaphysics to deliver a partial explanation of the conservational character of natural laws. That explanation relies on presentism, uniquely amongst temporal metaphysics, being able to support an endurantist account of persistence. In particular, after reconsidering a former argument for endurantism entailing presentism by Merricks, a new argument for this entailment, is expounded. Before delivering the explanation of the conservational character of natural laws, a brief account of that (...) explanandum is given, followed by an elaboration of the wider significance of an explanation for the conservational character for natural laws, particularly for the dispositional essentialist project of nomic reductionism, and explaining the non-simultaneity of causation. (shrink)

This paper considers a problem for dynamic presentism that has received little attention: its apparent inability to accommodate the duration of events. After outlining the problem, I defend presentism from it. This defence proceeds in two stages. First, I argue the objection rests on a faulty assumption: that duration is temporal extension. The paper challenges that assumption on several different ways of conceiving of temporal extension. This is the negative case and forms the bulk of the paper. Second, after diagnosing (...) the error leading to the identification of duration with temporal extension, I outline a new presentist-friendly account of duration that avoids the problem. In particular, a non-reductive account of duration is offered that treats it as a primitive quality which bestows its possessor with a certain modal quality: that the possessor potentially does not change whilst there are changes in its environs. This is the positive case. Together the positive and negative cases provide presentism with an interesting and novel way of overcoming the problem of duration. (shrink)