The argument from fine tuning is supposed to establish the existence of God from the fact that the evolution of carbon-based life requires the laws of physics and the boundary conditions of the universe to be more or less as they are. We demonstrate that this argument fails. In particular, we focus on problems associated with the role probabilities play in the argument. We show that, even granting the fine tuning of the universe, it does not follow that the universe (...) is improbable, thus no explanation of the fine tuning, theistic or otherwise, is required. (shrink)

The article is devoted to the philosophy of cosmology, its history and contemporary conditions, the tradition of studying and modern trends in teaching this discipline in higher education in Ukraine. There is problem of defining the subject of philosophy of cosmology, there are similar and different motifs with modern astrophysics, cosmology on the one hand, and, with the history of philosophy and modern philosophy on the other hand. The change in the subject of the philosophy of cosmology in the history (...) of philosophy and science has been studied in this article. A modern state of the philosophy of cosmology in modern philosophical education is demonstrated. (shrink)

This paper characterizes various responses to the question, 'Why does our universe exist?' Some responses- that the question is senseless, that the existence of our universe is logically necessary- are implausible. Adjudication between more plausible responses requires us to evaluate the argument from the 'fine-tuning' of the universe, a refurbished version of the argument from design that appeals to cosmology rather than biology. The evidence of fine-tuning should lead us to adopt, albeit provisionally, cosmological fecundity, the hypothesis that there exist (...) many universes of varying characters. The existence of our universe is thereby rendered less surprising. This is to be preferred both to the theistic hypothesis and to the view that the existence of our universe requires no explanation. (shrink)

Assuming minimal fine-individuation--that there are some necessarily equivalent intensional objects (e.g. propositions) that are nonetheless distinct objects, on standard actualist frameworks, the answer to our title question is "No". First I specify a fully cognitively accessible, purely qualitative maximal consistent state of affairs (MCS). (That there is an MCS that is either fully graspable or purely qualitative is in itself quite contrary to conventional dogma.) Then I identify another MCS, one necessarily equivalent to the first. It follows that there could (...) have been more than one obtaining MCS. I then argue that there is more than one obtaining MCS. So there is nothing answering to "the actual world", and the set of worlds is not the set of MCSs. I explore various patch-ups. Finally, I compare the actualist and modal realist notions of worlds, and I argue that even if the realist were right about concrete world ensembles, our reflections indicate that necessary truth is not truth in all worlds anyway, which undercuts the rationale for the realist's program. (shrink)

Philosophers of today are easy to stupefy. Try suggesting that some situations, such as enjoying a chess problem, really are in themselves better than others such as being burned alive: in themselves better in the sense that situations of the first sort would be preferable to those of the second if they existed all alone, so that one did not need to take consequences into account, and really better much as Africa is really bigger than Iceland, so that talk of (...) real betterness is not just a genuine, wholehearted act of prescribing, or an expression of personal taste like the remark that mustard really is nasty. You will stupefy many a philosopher. (shrink)