An argument has been made for identifying Mill as an individualistic thinker. Certainly, A System of Logic develops views, such as methodological individualism and a conception of the ‘art of life’, which portray persons as having unique essences that, when supported by autonomous choices with respect to life experiments, reveal their individuality. These views are at least loosely applied in later works. Principles of Political Economy treats economic aspects of social life frequently in terms consistent with those of classical economists (...) for whom the self-interested actions of individuals achieve economic growth. On Liberty, the flagship volume in this view, and, less centrally, The Subjection of Women provide impressive testimony for an individualistic way of life in terms of its contributions to social progress. Considerations on Representative Government examines means for institutionalizing an individualistic way of life. And Utilitarianism provides a basis for justifying an individualistic view of this social programme: more satisfaction of individual desires. But such an account, Mill's own assessment notwithstanding, would be unsatisfactory. (shrink)

This chapter considers the encounter of skepticism with the Kantian and post-Kantian philosophical enterprise and focuses on the intriguing feature whereby it is assimilated into this enterprise. In this period, skepticism becomes interchangeable with its other, which helps understand the proliferation of many kinds of views under its name and which forms the background for transforming skepticism into an anonymous, routine practice of raising objections and counter-objections to one’s own view. German philosophers of this era counterpose skepticism to dogmatism and (...) criticism, ancient to modern skepticism, and, importantly, conceptualize the transitions from one form to another, which forms the conceptual matrix in which new disciplinary forms, such as psychology, anthropology, and historicism contend for cultural-intellectual standing beside philosophy. I present this assimilationist trajectory by reviewing three well-known moments of this encounter of skepticism and idealism: (1) Kant’s idealization of skepticism as a floating position amidst various philosophical positions through the dialectic, polemics, systematics, and history of pure reason; (2) Fichte’s schematic conception of skepticism as a dispute of systems in the early Wissenschaftslehre following his review of the skeptic G. E. Schulze’s attacks on Critical philosophy; (3) Hegel’s historicizing conception of skepticism in the context of differences between subjective idealism and speculative thought and his early Jena review of another work by the same skeptic Schulze. (shrink)

Students of Mill's political theory know that he was both a political reformer and a social philosopher. An important part of Mill's life involved political struggles over the electoral franchise and schemes of parliamentary representation, the legal and social emancipation of women, land law and economic policy, and freedom of speech and the press. When turning to his best known writings such asOn Liberty, Considerations on Representative Government, Principles of Political EconomyandThe Subjection of Women, issues of reform intrude at almost (...) every point. Even his more philosophical writings—Utilitarianism, An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's PhilosophyandSystem of Logic— can be seen as attacks on or supports for those theories of man and society which Mill sees as hindering or furthering ‘the improvement of mankind’. Moreover, Mill's subsidiary careers as a journalist, editor of theLondon and Westminster Reviewand member of parliament further demonstrate his commitment to political reform. (shrink)

F. A. Hayek has had great influence upon recent political thought. Though he presents no organized account of Bentham his many references, mostly uncomplimentary, create the impression that Bentham's presentation was characteristically ‘crudely expressed’ and ‘naive’, and that Benthamite constructivism has been a major threat to individual liberty and a precursor of totalitarian social control. While Hayek has made a valuable contribution to the study of political ideas, this caricature has probably discouraged his readers from studying Bentham. It will be (...) argued, however, that Bentham and Hayek share much common ground, and that an appreciation of the ways in which Bentham's position differs from Hayek's may contribute to a useful critique of Hayek's system. (shrink)

This essay argues that Hume's political and historical thought is well read as skeptical and skeptical in a way that roots it deeply in the Hellenistic traditions of both Pyrrhonian and Academical thought. It deploys skeptical instruments to undermine political rationalism as well as theologically and metaphysically political ideologies. Hume's is politics of opinion and appearance. It labors to oppose faction and enthusiasm and generate suspension, balance, tranquility, and moderation. Because Hume advocate the use of reflectively generated but epistemically and (...) metaphysically suspensive general rules, his political thought is not intrinsically conservative. While it valorizes stability and peace, Humean politics accepts a contested and open-ended political order, one that requires continuous maintenance and revision but does not pretend to any ultimate or final progress or end. (shrink)

Wall is convincing on the Fuller court, but less so on Holmes, who may have understood Spencer's Social statics as a laissez faire rather than as a Darwinist document. Sharlin helps us to follow Spencer's attempt to universalize the concept of energy, even if Sharlin's explanation for Spencer's failure reduces to an application of the classical insight that physical phenomena are more predictable than social phenomena. Sharlin's conception of ‘scientism’ is helpful in some contexts, but less so in others; we (...) need to remind ourselves that the role of values in scientism is active as well as passive. (shrink)