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  1. Ethical Automaticity.M. Brownstein & A. Madva - 2012 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 42 (1):68-98.
    Social psychologists tell us that much of human behavior is automatic. It is natural to think that automatic behavioral dispositions are ethically desirable if and only if they are suitably governed by an agent’s reflective judgments. However, we identify a class of automatic dispositions that make normatively self-standing contributions to praiseworthy action and a well-lived life, independently of, or even in spite of, an agent’s reflective judgments about what to do. We argue that the fundamental questions for the "ethics of (...)
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  • Consciousness, Free Will, Moral Responsibility.Caruso Gregg - 2018 - In Rocco Gennaro (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Consciousness. New York: Routledge. pp. 89-91.
    In recent decades, with advances in the behavioral, cognitive, and neurosciences, the idea that patterns of human behavior may ultimately be due to factors beyond our conscious control has increasingly gained traction and renewed interest in the age-old problem of free will. To properly assess what, if anything, these empirical advances can tell us about free will and moral responsibility, we first need to get clear on the following questions: Is consciousness necessary for free will? If so, what role or (...)
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  • Context-Switching and Responsiveness to Real Relevance.Erik Rietveld - 2012 - In Julian Kiverstein & Michael Wheeler (eds.), Heidegger and Cognitive Science. Palgrave-Macmillan.
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  • Précis of Neil Levy’s Consciousness and Moral Responsibility.Gregg Caruso - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (7-8):7-15.
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  • Doing Without Deliberation: Automatism, Automaticity, and Moral Accountability,.Neil Levy & Tim Bayne - 2004 - International Review of Psychiatry 16 (4):209-15.
    Actions performed in a state of automatism are not subject to moral evaluation, while automatic actions often are. Is the asymmetry between automatistic and automatic agency justified? In order to answer this question we need a model or moral accountability that does justice to our intuitions about a range of modes of agency, both pathological and non-pathological. Our aim in this paper is to lay the foundations for such an account.
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  • The Basing Relation.Ram Neta - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (2):179-217.
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  • Capacities and Counterfactuals: A Reply to Haji and McKenna.Neil Levy - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (4):607-620.
    In a recent paper, Ishtiyaque Haji and Michael McKenna argue that my attack on Frankfurt-style cases fails. I had argued that we cannot be confident that agents in these cases retain their responsibility-underwriting capacities, because what capacities an agent has can depend on features of the world external to her, including merely counterfactual interveners. Haji and McKenna argue that only when an intervention is actual does the agent gain or lose a capacity. Here I demonstrate that this claim is false: (...)
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  • Consciousness, Implicit Attitudes and Moral Responsibility.Neil Levy - 2014 - Noûs 48 (1):21-40.
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