- Imprecise evidence without imprecise credences.Jennifer Rose Carr - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2735-2758.details
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Confirmation of Scientific Hypotheses as Relations.Aysel Dogan - 2005 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 36 (2):243-259.details
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Vague Credence.Aidan Lyon - 2017 - Synthese 194 (10):3931-3954.details
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Kyburg on ignoring base rates.Stephen Spielman - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):261-262.details
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Psychology and the foundations of rational belief.Ryan D. Tweney, Michael E. Doherty & Clifford R. Mynatt - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):262-263.details
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Decisions with indeterminate probabilities.Teddy Seidenfeld - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):259-261.details
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A defense of imprecise credences in inference and decision making1.James Joyce - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):281-323.details
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Two dogmas of strong objective bayesianism.Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay & Gordon Brittan - 2010 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (1):45 – 65.details
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Which comes first: Logic or rationality?P. N. Johnson-Laird - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):252-253.details
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Rational belief.Henry E. Kyburg - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):231-245.details
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The logic is in the representation.Russell Revlin - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):259-259.details
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Confirming confirmation bias.P. Pollard - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):258-259.details
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Psychology, statistics, and analytical epistemology.Richard E. Nisbett & Paul Thagard - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):257-258.details
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Contrapositivism; or, The only evidence worth paying for is contained in the negatives.David Miller - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):256-257.details
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Normative theories of rationality: Occam's razor, Procrustes' bed?Lola L. Lopes - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):255-256.details
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Conjunctive bliss.Isaac Levi - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):254-255.details
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The role of logic in reason, inference, and decision.Henry E. Kyburg - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):263-273.details
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Philosophical arguments, psychological experiments, and the problem of consistency.D. Kahneman - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):253-254.details
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Troubles for Bayesian Formal Epistemology.Terry Horgan - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):1-23.details
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Logic and probability theory versus canons of rationality.Gilbert Harman - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):251-251.details
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Kyburg on practical certainty.Willam L. Harper - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):251-252.details
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Psychological objectives for logical theories.J. St B. T. Evans - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):250-250.details
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In philosophical defence of Bayesian rationality.Jon Dorling - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):249-250.details
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Belief, acceptance, and probability.L. Jonathan Cohen - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):248-249.details
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To err is human.Maya Bar-Hillel & Avishai Margalit - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):246-248.details
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Human rationality: Essential conflicts, multiple ideals.Jonathan E. Adler - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):245-246.details
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Achieving epistemic descent.Brett Andrew Coppenger - 2012 - Dissertation, University of Iowadetails
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