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Epistemology and Inference

Noûs 20 (3):417 (1986)

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  1. Imprecise evidence without imprecise credences.Jennifer Rose Carr - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2735-2758.
    Does rationality require imprecise credences? Many hold that it does: imprecise evidence requires correspondingly imprecise credences. I argue that this is false. The imprecise view faces the same arbitrariness worries that were meant to motivate it in the first place. It faces these worries because it incorporates a certain idealization. But doing away with this idealization effectively collapses the imprecise view into a particular kind of precise view. On this alternative, our attitudes should reflect a kind of normative uncertainty: uncertainty (...)
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  • Confirmation of Scientific Hypotheses as Relations.Aysel Dogan - 2005 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 36 (2):243-259.
    In spite of several attempts to explicate the relationship between a scientific hypothesis and evidence, the issue still cries for a satisfactory solution. Logical approaches to confirmation, such as the hypothetico-deductive method and the positive instance account of confirmation, are problematic because of their neglect of the semantic dimension of hypothesis confirmation. Probabilistic accounts of confirmation are no better than logical approaches in this regard. An outstanding probabilistic account of confirmation, the Bayesian approach, for instance, is found to be defective (...)
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  • Vague Credence.Aidan Lyon - 2017 - Synthese 194 (10):3931-3954.
    It is natural to think of precise probabilities as being special cases of imprecise probabilities, the special case being when one’s lower and upper probabilities are equal. I argue, however, that it is better to think of the two models as representing two different aspects of our credences, which are often vague to some degree. I show that by combining the two models into one model, and understanding that model as a model of vague credence, a natural interpretation arises that (...)
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  • Kyburg on ignoring base rates.Stephen Spielman - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):261-262.
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  • Psychology and the foundations of rational belief.Ryan D. Tweney, Michael E. Doherty & Clifford R. Mynatt - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):262-263.
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  • Decisions with indeterminate probabilities.Teddy Seidenfeld - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):259-261.
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  • A defense of imprecise credences in inference and decision making1.James Joyce - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):281-323.
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  • Two dogmas of strong objective bayesianism.Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay & Gordon Brittan - 2010 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (1):45 – 65.
    We introduce a distinction, unnoticed in the literature, between four varieties of objective Bayesianism. What we call ' strong objective Bayesianism' is characterized by two claims, that all scientific inference is 'logical' and that, given the same background information two agents will ascribe a unique probability to their priors. We think that neither of these claims can be sustained; in this sense, they are 'dogmatic'. The first fails to recognize that some scientific inference, in particular that concerning evidential relations, is (...)
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  • Which comes first: Logic or rationality?P. N. Johnson-Laird - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):252-253.
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  • Rational belief.Henry E. Kyburg - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):231-245.
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  • The logic is in the representation.Russell Revlin - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):259-259.
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  • Confirming confirmation bias.P. Pollard - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):258-259.
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  • Psychology, statistics, and analytical epistemology.Richard E. Nisbett & Paul Thagard - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):257-258.
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  • Contrapositivism; or, The only evidence worth paying for is contained in the negatives.David Miller - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):256-257.
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  • Normative theories of rationality: Occam's razor, Procrustes' bed?Lola L. Lopes - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):255-256.
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  • Conjunctive bliss.Isaac Levi - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):254-255.
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  • The role of logic in reason, inference, and decision.Henry E. Kyburg - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):263-273.
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  • Philosophical arguments, psychological experiments, and the problem of consistency.D. Kahneman - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):253-254.
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  • Troubles for Bayesian Formal Epistemology.Terry Horgan - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):1-23.
    I raise skeptical doubts about the prospects of Bayesian formal epistemology for providing an adequate general normative model of epistemic rationality. The notion of credence, I argue, embodies a very dubious psychological myth, viz., that for virtually any proposition p that one can entertain and understand, one has some quantitatively precise, 0-to-1 ratio-scale, doxastic attitude toward p. The concept of credence faces further serious problems as well—different ones depending on whether credence 1 is construed as full belief (the limit case (...)
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  • Logic and probability theory versus canons of rationality.Gilbert Harman - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):251-251.
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  • Kyburg on practical certainty.Willam L. Harper - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):251-252.
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  • Psychological objectives for logical theories.J. St B. T. Evans - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):250-250.
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  • In philosophical defence of Bayesian rationality.Jon Dorling - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):249-250.
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  • Belief, acceptance, and probability.L. Jonathan Cohen - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):248-249.
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  • To err is human.Maya Bar-Hillel & Avishai Margalit - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):246-248.
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  • Human rationality: Essential conflicts, multiple ideals.Jonathan E. Adler - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):245-246.
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  • Achieving epistemic descent.Brett Andrew Coppenger - 2012 - Dissertation, University of Iowa
    Traditional accounts of justification can be characterized as trying to analyze justification in such a way that having a justified belief brings with it assurance of truth. The internalist offers a demanding requirement on justification: one's having a justified belief requires that one see what the belief has going for it. Externalists worry that the internalist's narrow conception of justification will lead to unacceptably radical and implausible skepticism. According to the externalist, one need not know what a belief has going (...)
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