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  1. Peirce, Levi, and the aims of inquiry.Cheryl Misak - 1987 - Philosophy of Science 54 (2):256-265.
    Isaac Levi uses C. S. Peirce's fallibilism as a foil for his own "epistemological infallibilism". I argue that Levi's criticisms of Peirce do not hit their target, and that the two pragmatists agree on the fundamental issues concerning background knowledge, certainty, revision of belief, and the aims of inquiry.
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  • How strong is the argument from inductive risk?Tobias Henschen - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (3):1-23.
    The argument from inductive risk, as developed by Rudner and others, famously concludes that the scientist qua scientist makes value judgments. The paper aims to show that trust in the soundness of the argument is overrated – that philosophers who endorse its conclusion fail to refute two of the most important objections that have been raised to its soundness: Jeffrey’s objection that the genuine task of the scientist is to assign probabilities to hypotheses, and Levi’s objection that the argument is (...)
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