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  1. Pragmatic Neuroethics: Lived Experiences as a Source of Moral Knowledge.Gabriela Pavarini & Ilina Singh - 2018 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 27 (4):578-589.
    Abstract:In this article, we present a pragmatic approach to neuroethics, referring back to John Dewey and his articulation of the “common good” and its discovery through systematic methods. Pragmatic neuroethics bridges philosophy and social sciences and, at a very basic level, considers that ethics is not dissociable from lived experiences and everyday moral choices. We reflect on the integration between empirical methods and normative questions, using as our platform recent bioethical and neuropsychological research into moral cognition, action, and experience. Finally, (...)
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  • What Would John Stuart Mill Say? A Utilitarian Perspective on Contemporary Neuroscience Debates in Leadership.Dirk Lindebaum & Effi Raftopoulou - 2017 - Journal of Business Ethics 144 (4):813-822.
    The domain of organizational neuroscience increasingly influences leadership research and practice in terms of both selection and interventions. The dominant view is that the use of neuroscientific theories and methods offers better and refined predictions of what constitutes good leadership. What has been omitted so far, however, is a deeper engagement with ethical theories. This engagement is imperative as it helps problematize a great deal of the current advocacy around organizational neuroscience. In this article, we draw upon John Stuart Mill’s (...)
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  • Bioenhanced “Virtues” May Threaten Personal Identity.Gina Lebkuecher, Kit Rempala, Sydney Samoska, Marley Hornewer & Joseph Vukov - 2021 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 12 (2-3):117-119.
    Fabiano argues that virtue theory offers the best “safety framework” for mitigating the risks of moral enhancement (1). He advances five desiderata for an ideal safety framework and then explains how virtue theory satisfies each. Among these desiderata is the “preservation of identity” (1). Fabiano argues that moral enhancement can safely preserve personal identity when carried out within the framework of virtue theory. We suggest Fabiano's argument for this conclusion falls short, since contra Fabiano’s claim, enhancing virtues may not preserve—and (...)
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  • Does Memory Modification Threaten Our Authenticity?Alexandre Erler - 2010 - Neuroethics 4 (3):235-249.
    One objection to enhancement technologies is that they might lead us to live inauthentic lives. Memory modification technologies (MMTs) raise this worry in a particularly acute manner. In this paper I describe four scenarios where the use of MMTs might be said to lead to an inauthentic life. I then undertake to justify that judgment. I review the main existing accounts of authenticity, and present my own version of what I call a “true self” account (intended as a complement, rather (...)
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  • Reasons, reflection, and repugnance.Doug McConnell & Jeanette Kennett - 2016 - In Alberto Giubilini & Steve Clarke (eds.), The Ethics of Human Enhancement: Understanding the Debate. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    In this chapter we draw comparisons between Kass’ views on the normative authority of repugnance and social intuitionist accounts of moral judgement which are similarly sceptical about the role of reasoned reflection in moral judgement. We survey the empirical claims made in support of giving moral primacy to intuitions generated by emotions such as repugnance, as well as some common objections. We then examine accounts which integrate intuition and reflection, and argue that plausible accounts of wisdom are in tension with (...)
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