While Maurice Merleau-Ponty thought that the natural sciences could offer partial explanations of the world, he maintained that they were incomplete and further understanding required an existential analysis or a study of the pre-theoretical and pre-reflective structures that are the conditions of the possibility of experience. He offered a series of arguments against both the possibility of the sciences explaining the world in general and their ability to explain the phenomenon of perception in particular.In his paper, "Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenological Critique of (...) Natural Science," Thomas Baldwin pushes back on both of these positions, arguing that Merleau-Ponty offered insufficient proof of his... (shrink)

نوخاسته‌گرایان مشهوری نظیر نانسی مورفی و پاول دیویس مدعی‌اند قبول برخی دیدگاه‌های نوخاسته‌گرایانه وقوع تحولی اساسی در پارادایم علمی حاکم را در پی دارد. در این مقاله، نخست با واکاوی مضامین اصلی مربوط به مواضعی نظیر طبیعت‌گرایی، تقلیل‌گرایی، علم‌گرایی و نظیر اینها، تحلیلی کلی از مؤلفه‌های پارادایم علمی ارائه می‌شود. در ضمن این تحلیل، مؤلفه‌های مختلف مربوط به پارادایم علمی تبیین شده، نسبت این مؤلفه‌ها با یکدیگر بررسی می‌شود. پس از آن، به بررسی دیدگاه‌های نوخاسته‌گرایانه از هر دو قسم نوخاسته‌گرایی (...) ضعیف و نوخاسته‌گرایی قوی می‌پردازیم، و پس از دسته‌بندی این دیدگاه‌ها، نسبتشان را با مؤلفه‌های پارادایم علمی ارزیابی می‌کنیم. بررسی و دسته‌بندی دیدگاه‌های نوخاسته‌گرایانه بر اساس تفکیک دیدگاه‌های قائل به وجود سلسله‌مراتب در طبیعت در مقابل دیدگاه‌های قائل به سلسله‌مراتبی بودن تبیین، و نیز دیدگاه‌های مختلف درباره امکان و نحوه اثرگذاری علّی سطوح بالاتر از سطح فیزیکی بر وضعیت جهان انجام می‌شود. نتیجه این بررسی نشان می‌دهد که بر خلاف دیدگاه نوخاسته‌گرایانی نظیر مورفی و دیویس، قبول نوخاسته‌گرایی وقوع تحول پارادایمی را در پی ندارد و برخی دیدگاه‌های خاص ذیل این موضع فلسفی، به صورت محدود، با برخی مؤلفه‌های پارادایم علمی حاکم ناسازگارند. (shrink)

Any panpsychism building complex consciousness out of basic atoms of consciousness needs a theory of ‘mental chemistry’ explaining how this building works. This paper argues that split-brain patients show actual mental chemistry or at least give reasons for thinking it possible. The paper next develops constraints on theories of mental chemistry. It then puts forward models satisfying these constraints. The paper understands mental chemistry as a transformation consistent with conservation of consciousness rather than an aggregation perhaps followed by the creation (...) of something in addition. The paper suggests that this kind of mental chemistry alone yields a workable panpsychism. (shrink)

This article uses causation to show that panpsychism and emergentism share far less than most philosophers suppose. It argues that panpsychism has features, among them its rationalism, that force what the article calls a strong account of causation. And that emergentism entails what the article calls a weak account of causation incompatible with any strong account. The article then ventures that panpsychism and emergentism form parts of two wide-ranging but incompatible metaphysical packages.

We more or less understand how composition works in the case of objects. We cement bricks together to build a wall. We stir together red paint and yellow paint to get orange paint. In both cases, one way or another, A = B + C. This paper examines composition in the case of concrete natural properties. It explains why property composition is so much less straightforward than object composition. Then it distinguishes strictly basic properties , compositely basic properties , and (...) fully non-basic properties . It shows how strictly basic properties compose, or result in, compositely basic and fully non-basic properties, which differ from, yet depend for their natures on, the strictly basic properties they result from. It explains the characteristics and differences of these types of properties. It notes that the existence of compositely basic and non-basic properties grounds an argument for the genuine existence of co.. (shrink)

This paper argues, not that physicalism is wrong, but that it is irrational. The paper defines standards of rationality, both metaphysical and epistemological, that physicalism necessarily inherits from science. Then it assesses physicalist efforts to naturalize consciousness in light of these. It concludes that physicalism allows its metaphysics to outrun its epistemology, in defiance of applicable standards, revealing a fundamental incoherence in the doctrine. The paper also briefly reviews other naturalization programs, to claim that physicalism, unlike the sciences, hasn’t proved (...) fruitful. (shrink)