- Spielman and Lewis on inductive immodesty.David Lewis - 1974 - Philosophy of Science 41 (1):84-85.details
|
|
Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.details
|
|
Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):892-916.details
|
|
Immoderately rational.Sophie Horowitz - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):41-56.details
|
|
Accurate believers are deductively cogent.Matthew Hewson - 2021 - Noûs 56 (4):763-786.details
|
|
A defense of objectivism about evidential support.Brian Hedden - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):716-743.details
|
|
How to endorse conciliationism.Will Fleisher - 2021 - Synthese 198 (10):9913-9939.details
|
|
Seek the Joints! Avoid the Gruesome! Fidelity as an Epistemic Value.Peter Finocchiaro - 2023 - Episteme 20 (2):393-409.details
|
|
Epistemology without metaphysics.Hartry Field - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (2):249 - 290.details
|
|
Second best epistemology: fallibility and normativity.Joshua DiPaolo - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2043-2066.details
|
|
Evidence and fallibility.Joshua DiPaolo - 2019 - Episteme 16 (1):39-55.details
|
|
When Rational Reasoners Reason Differently.Michael G. Titelbaum & Matthew Kopec - 2019details
|
|
Learning from Scientific Disagreement.Bruno Borge & Nicolás Lo Guercio - 2021 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 36 (3):375-398.details
|
|
Proper scoring rules in epistemic decision theory.Maomei Wang - 2020 - Dissertation, Lingnan Universitydetails
|
|
Epistemic Modesty Defended.David Christensen - 2013 - In David Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 77.details
|
|
Logical Form and the Limits of Thought.Manish Oza - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Torontodetails
|
|
Fallibility and Normativity.DiPaolo Joshua - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts - Amherstdetails
|
|
Luck, Rationality, and Explanation.Joshua Schechter - manuscriptdetails
|
|
Are There Indefeasible Epistemic Rules?Darren Bradley - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19.details
|
|
Precise Credences.Michael Titelbaum - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPaper Foundation. pp. 1-55.details
|
|