“Bodily autonomy” has received significant attention in bioethics, medical ethics, and medical law in terms of the general inviolability of a patient’s bodily sovereignty and the rights of patients to make choices (e.g., reproductive choices) that concern their own body. However, the role of the body in terms of how it can or does contribute to a patient’s capacity for, or exercises of their autonomy in clinical decision-making situations has not been explicitly addressed. The approach to autonomy in this paper (...) is aligned with traditional theories that conceive autonomy in terms of an individual’s capacities for, and exercises of rational reflection. However, at the same time, this paper extends these accounts by arguing that autonomy is, in part, embodied. Specifically, by drawing on phenomenological conceptions of the experience of autonomy, we argue that, in principle, the body is a necessary component of the capacity for autonomy. Secondly, through the presentation of two different cases, we highlight ways in which a patient’s body can contribute to the autonomy of treatment choices. Ultimately, we hope to encourage others to explore additional conditions under which a concept of embodied autonomy should be employed in medical decision making, how its underlying principles might be operationalised in clinical situations, and its consequences for approaches to patient autonomy in healthcare practice, policy, and law. (shrink)

This entry summarizes an emerging subdiscipline of both empirical bioethics and experimental philosophy (“x-phi”) which has variously been referred to as experimental philosophical bioethics, experimental bioethics, or simply “bioxphi”. Like empirical bioethics, bioxphi uses data-driven research methods to capture what various stakeholders think (feel, judge, etc.) about moral issues of relevance to bioethics. However, like its other parent discipline of x-phi, bioxphi tends to favor experiment-based designs drawn from the cognitive sciences – including psychology, neuroscience, and behavioral economics – to (...) tease out why and how stakeholders think as they do. (shrink)

Chronic pain is a common disorder with enormous sociomedical importance. A major part of primary and secondary costs of illness is caused by the various pain syndromes. Nociception – the sensory perception of a painful stimulus – is a complex process relying on an intricate system of anatomical, neurophysiological and biochemical networks. This applies even more so to pain – the state of experiencing a nociceptive event, of interpreting it in terms of meaning for the affected individual and of suffering (...) a range of emotions it elicits. This intricacy renders it obvious, that the empirical medical sciences alone cannot explain all aspects of pain. Hence, it has also become a focus of phenomenological research. One aspect of these investigations is the interaction of pain and the perception of the lived body’s spatiality. The focus of this article will build on these concepts to develop a construct of the alteration of temporality caused by chronic pain and the effects this spells out for the affected subject. To this end, I will primarily draw on Merleau-Ponty’s ideas of the lived body as well as on theories of enactivism and embodiment. I will also point out parallels to neuroscientific data, thereby demonstrating the proximity of phenomenology and neuroscience. A possible partial solution to the pain dilemma may be derived from psychology: techniques relying on cognitive behavioural intervention, awareness training, and existential analysis may provide alleviation to patients suffering from chronic pain. (shrink)

Patient decision-making autonomy refers to the patients’ ability to freely exert their own choices and make their own decisions, given sufficient resources and information to do so. In pain medicine, it is accepted that appropriate beneficial management aims to propose an individualized treatment plan shared with the patients, as agents, to help them live as autonomously as possible with their pain. However, are patients in chronic pain centers sufficiently autonomous to participate in the therapeutic decisions that concern them? As this (...) question still remains unanswered, a pilot study was set up to that aim. Over a 2-month period, first-time patients within a tertiary multidisciplinary pain center underwent a systematic evaluation of their autonomy using the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool for Treatment (MacCAT-T), considered the benchmark tool for measuring a patient’s ability to consent to treatment. Demographic data and pain characteristics of the patients were collected and their respective attending pain physicians were asked to clinically assess their patients’ degree of autonomy. Another physician, who had not participated in the initial patient evaluation, subsequently administered the MacCAT-T questionnaire to the same patients. Twenty-seven patients were included during the study period (21 women and 6 men), with an average age of 50 years. The average duration of pain was 8 years. Based on their clinical experience, the 4 different pain physicians in charge of these patients considered that out of 25 assessed patients, 22 of them (89%) had full decision-making capacity, with no deficit in autonomy. According to the MacCAT-T results, only 13 of these 25 patients (48%) had no deficit, while 7 (26%) had a major deficit in autonomy. The only patient characteristic that appeared to be related to autonomy was pain type, specifically nociplastic pain. The average time taken to complete the test was 20 min, and patients were very satisfied with the interview. Results from the present pilot study suggest that patients suffering from chronic pain do not appear to be entirely autonomous in their decision to consent to the proposed treatment plan according to the MacCAT-T questionnaire, and physicians seem to find it difficult to properly assess this competence in a clinical setting. Further studies with larger samples are needed to better evaluate this concept to improve the complex management of these patients. (shrink)