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Relationality without obligation

Analysis 82 (2):238-246 (2022)

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  1. Second‐Personal Approaches to Moral Obligation.Janis David Schaab - 2023 - Philosophy Compass 18 (3):1 - 11.
    According to second‐personal approaches to moral obligation, the distinctive normative features of moral obligation can only be explained in terms of second‐personal relations, i.e. the distinctive way persons relate to each other as persons. But there are important disagreements between different groups of second‐personal approaches. Most notably, they disagree about the nature of second‐personal relations, which has consequences for the nature of the obligations that they purport to explain. This article aims to distinguish these groups from each other, highlight their (...)
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  • An Interpersonal Form of Faith.Yuan Tian - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    An athlete has faith in her unathletic partner to run a marathon, a teacher has faith in her currently poor-performing students to improve in the future, and your friend has faith in you to succeed in the difficult project that you have been pursuing, even, and especially, when your chance of failing is non-trivial. This paper develops and defends a relational view of interpersonal faith by considering four interesting phenomena: first, in virtue of placing faith in someone, we stand in (...)
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  • Integrity and Morality.Janis David Schaab - 2025 - The Monist 108 (1):47-58.
    This paper defends a strong link between personal integrity and morality in a way that preserves the overriding and universal authority of impartial morality. I argue that, when we are committed to a personal project or relationship, we hold ourselves accountable, from the perspective of a corresponding practical identity, for living up to the commitment. Under the right conditions, this generates an obligation to ourselves. Supposing that holding someone accountable constitutively presupposes a version of Kant’s Formula of Humanity (as Stephen (...)
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  • Romantic love and the first-person plural perspective.Felipe León - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    On the assumption that romantic partners tend to act from a first-person plural perspective, how should the love that binds them be understood? This paper approaches this question by focusing on romantic practical integration, understood as the tendency of romantic partners to integrate their practical perspectives in such a way that allows them to have ‘reasons-for-us’: reasons for action that apply to them as a group, in a collective and non-distributive sense (Westlund Citation2009). After dispelling some reservations about the connection (...)
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