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Self-knowledge in Aristotle

Topoi 15 (1):39-58 (1996)

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  1. Why the Intellect Cannot Have a Bodily Organ: De Anima 3.4.Caleb Cohoe - 2013 - Phronesis 58 (4):347-377.
    I reconstruct Aristotle’s reasons for thinking that the intellect cannot have a bodily organ. I present Aristotle’s account of the aboutness or intentionality of cognitive states, both perceptual and intellectual. On my interpretation, Aristotle’s account is based around the notion of cognitive powers taking on forms in a special preservative way. Based on this account, Aristotle argues that no physical structure could enable a bodily part or combination of bodily parts to produce or determine the full range of forms that (...)
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  • How Aristotle Changes Anaxagoras’s Mind.Jason W. Carter - 2019 - Apeiron 52 (1):1-28.
    I argue that a common interpretation of DA 3.4, which sees Aristotle as there rejecting Anaxagoras’s account of mind, is mistaken. Instead, I claim that, in providing his solution to the main puzzles of this chapter, Aristotle takes special care to preserve the essential features that he thinks Anaxagoras ascribes to mind, namely, its ability to know all things, its being unmixed, and its inability to be affected by mixed objects.
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  • ‘Obviously all this Agrees with my Will and my Intellect’: Schopenhauer on Active and PassiveNousin Aristotle'sDe Animaiii.5.Mor Segev - 2014 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (3):535-556.
    In one of the unpublished parts of his manuscript titled the Spicilegia, Arthur Schopenhauer presents an uncharacteristically sympathetic reading of an Aristotelian text. The text in question, De anima III. 5, happens to include the only occurrence of arguably the most controversial idea in Aristotle, namely the distinction between active and passive nous. Schopenhauer interprets these two notions as corresponding to his own notions of the ?will? and the ?intellect? or ?subject of knowledge?, respectively. The result is a unique interpretation, (...)
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  • Commentary on Sisko.Michael Pakaluk - 2000 - Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 16 (1):199-206.
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  • Kinds of Self-Knowledge in Ancient Thought.Fiona Leigh - 2020 - In Self-Knowledge in Ancient Philosophy: The Eighth Keeling Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-50.
    This chapter explores the topic of self-knowledge in ancient thought, asking in particular what the ancient concept (or concepts) of knowing oneself amounts to. The chapter begins by contrasting the issues which occupy ancient and contemporary discussions of self-knowledge, and the obvious points of continuity and discontinuity between the two. The author isolates two forms of self-knowledge: cognitive self-knowledge or knowledge of one’s own mental states, and dispositional self-knowledge or knowledge of one’s moral or intellectual dispositions, and traces the treatment (...)
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