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Tharp’s third theorem

Analysis 62 (2):95–97 (2002)

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  1. Conceptual mastery and the knowledge argument.Gabriel Rabin - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (1):125-147.
    According to Frank Jackson’s famous knowledge argument, Mary, a brilliant neuroscientist raised in a black and white room and bestowed with complete physical knowledge, cannot know certain truths about phenomenal experience. This claim about knowledge, in turn, implies that physicalism is false. I argue that the knowledge argument founders on a dilemma. Either (i) Mary cannot know the relevant experiential truths because of trivial obstacles that have no bearing on the truth of physicalism or (ii) once the obstacles have been (...)
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  • Tharp’s theorems of metaphysics and the notion of necessary truth.Jordan Stein - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4).
    Leslie Tharp proves three theorems concerning epistemic and metaphysical modality for conventional modal predicate logic: every truth is a priori equivalent to a necessary truth, every truth is necessarily equivalent to an a priori truth, and every truth is a priori equivalent to a contingent truth. Lloyd Humberstone has shown that these theorems also hold in the modal system Actuality Modal Logic, the logic that results from the addition of the actuality operator to conventional modal logic. We show that Tharp’s (...)
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  • The Analysis of Possibility and the Extent of Possibility.John Divers - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (2):183-200.
    In section 1 I motivate and execute the presentation of a well-defined Lewisian conception of analysis and of what it would be to analyse modality successfully. That conception is then put to two applications. In section 2 various inadequacies are exposed in a (recently popular) separatist approach to the understanding and/or evaluation of Lewis's analysis of modality. Section 3 provides a defence against a resilient argument for the claim that Lewis's analysis of modality cannot be fully reductive while also dealing (...)
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