Psychoanalysis is sometimes thought to rely on a “pragmatic theory of truth,” whose chief assumption should be that the effectiveness of a treatment counts as evidence for the truth of the interpretations provided during each treatment, and/or the psychoanalytic ontology of mind itself. While there is some support for this claim in psychoanalytic views both on the nature of psychic reality and on clinical practice, it needs qualification. It should not be taken to imply that the theory is true because (...) or insofar as it (clinically) works. What I mean to show is, rather, that psychoanalysis is a distinctive illustration of the pragmatist concept that effective explanations are, in Dewey’s words, “experimental,” and adjust themselves to real processes while changing reality, and indeed by changing reality. Truth enjoys, in psychoanalysis, a peculiar status, being what one might call an emergent property of a relational process. But not just any relational process, even if it “works,” will produce truth. The key of psychoanalytic treatment is transference, and the main pragmatic character of transference is what one may call its theatrical quality. I try to clarify this through a comparison of Freud’s and Pierre Janet’s clinical approaches. (shrink)