There are different formulations of the doctrine of double effect (DDE), and sometimes philosophers propose “revisions” or alternatives, like the means principle, for instance. To demonstrate that such principles are needed in the first place, one would have to compare cases in which all else is equal and show that the difference in intuitions, if any, can only be explained by the one remaining difference and thus by the principle in question. This is not the methodology defenders of the DDE (...) and of related principles use, however. I will discuss how they actually proceed, focusing on their preferred four pairs of examples. While these examples might have rhetorical force, they are nevertheless philosophically and methodologically useless (since they do not keep all else equal). As a corrective, I shall offer examples that do keep all else equal. These examples undermine the DDE and related principles. I then argue that while the Loop case and the “closeness” problem in the context of Jonathan Bennett’s Sophisticated Bomber example might once have been an embarrassment of sorts for defenders of the DDE, meanwhile their discussion serves as a convenient distraction from the many clear examples disproving the DDE and related principles. I conclude that there is simply no sufficient intuitive support for the DDE or related principles. Instead of looking for their “rationales,” they should be abandoned. (shrink)

A recent administrative law decision in Victoria, Australia, applied double effect reasoning in a novel way. Double effect reasoning has hitherto been used to legitimate treatments which may shorten life but where the intent of treatment is pain relief. The situation reviewed by the Victorian tribunal went further, supporting actions where a doctor agrees to provide pentobarbitone to a patient at some time in the future if the patient feels at that time that his pain is unbearable and he wants (...) to end his life. The offer to provide the drug was described as a palliative treatment in that it gave reassurance and comfort to the patient. Double effect reasoning was extended in this instance to encompass potentially facilitating a patient’s death. This extension further muddies the murky double effect reasoning waters and creates another challenge to this concept. (shrink)

There are different formulations of the doctrine of double effect, and sometimes philosophers propose “revisions” or alternatives, like the means principle, for instance. To demonstrate that such principles are needed in the first place, one would have to compare cases in which all else is equal and show that the difference in intuitions, if any, can only be explained by the one remaining difference and thus by the principle in question. This is not the methodology defenders of the DDE and (...) of related principles use, however. I will discuss how they actually proceed, focusing on their preferred four pairs of examples. While these examples might have rhetorical force, they are nevertheless philosophically and methodologically useless. As a corrective, I shall offer examples that do keep all else equal. These examples undermine the DDE and related principles. I then argue that while the Loop case and the “closeness” problem in the context of Jonathan Bennett’s Sophisticated Bomber example might once have been an embarrassment of sorts for defenders of the DDE, meanwhile their discussion serves as a convenient distraction from the many clear examples disproving the DDE and related principles. I conclude that the methodological mistakes found in defenses of the DDE – the biased framing, the rigged examples, the empirically unwarranted claims about how widely shared certain intuitions are, and the avoidance of the strongest counter-examples – can only be explained by systematic bias. There is simply no sufficient intuitive support for the DDE or related principles. Thus, instead of looking for their “rationales,” they should be abandoned. (shrink)

Recently, Gerhard Øverland and Alec Walen have developed novel and interesting theories of nonconsequentialism. Unlike other nonconsequentialist theories such as the Doctrine of Double Effect, each of their theories denies that an agent’s mental states are relevant for determining how stringent their moral reasons are against harming others. Instead, Øverland and Walen seek to distinguish morally between instances of harming in terms of the circumstances of the people who will be harmed, rather than in features of the agent doing the (...) harming. In this paper, we argue that these theories yield counterintuitive verdicts across a broad range of cases that other nonconsequentialist theories handle with relative ease. We also argue that Walen’s recent attempt to reformulate this type of theory so that it does not have such implications is unsuccessful. (shrink)

The Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) provides that, all else equal, intentional deaths are harder to justify than merely foreseen deaths. The principle is meant to ground the distinction within humanitarian law between terror bombing and strategic bombing. However, according to the “closeness problem,” terror bombers are not necessarily intentional killers. Terror bombing strictly requires only that the civilians appear dead, goes the argument, such that—for a “sophisticated” terror bomber—the civilians’ deaths could be unintended side-effects of making them appear dead. (...) But if intentions could be calibrated so finely and strategically, the argument continues, then the DDE would very doubtfully be true. This essay replies to the closeness problem in three steps. First, agents often intend _causal processes_, with specific causal “ingredients,” as the proximate means of bringing about their specifically intended means or ends. Second, when an agent foresees a byproduct as resulting directly from their intended causal process, it is morally equivalent to a specifically intended outcome. The process’s causal relationship to the byproduct is constitutive of the process from the agent’s perspective. Third, a “sophisticated” terror bomber’s intended causal process involves blowing up the civilians, while a strategic bomber’s involves blowing up, say, a munitions factory. Thus, because the “sophisticated” terror bomber foresees their intended causal process as resulting directly in the civilians’ deaths, while the strategic bomber foresees their deaths as side-effects of their intended causal process occurring within an environment that happens to contain civilians, the DDE can distinguish between the bombers. (shrink)