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  1. Conscious and unconscious processes: Same or different?Philip M. Merikle & Jim Cheesman - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):547-548.
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  • Timing volition: Questions of what and when about W.James L. Ringo - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):550-551.
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  • Problems with the psychophysics of intention.Bruno G. Breitmeyer - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):539-540.
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  • Can functional and phenomenal consciousness be divided?J. G. Taylor - 2012 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 4 (02):457-469.
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  • Can neuroscience provide a complete account of human nature?: A reply to Roger Sperry.James W. Jones - 1992 - Zygon 27 (2):187-202.
    In a recent Zygon article (June 1991), Roger Sperry argues for the unification of science and religion based on the principle of emergent causation within the central nervous system. After illustrating Sperry's position with some current experiments, I suggest that his conclusions exceed his argument and the findings of contemporary neuroscience and propose instead a pluralistic, rather than unified, approach to the relations between religion and science necessitated by the incompleteness inherent in any strictly neurological account of human nature.
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  • Emergence of Mind From Brain: The Biological Roots of the Hermeneutic Circle.Roland Fischer - 1987 - Diogenes 35 (138):1-25.
    Brain functions are stochastic processes without intentionality whereas mind emerges from brain functions as a Hegelian “change from quantity”, that is, on the order of 1012 profusely interconnected neurons, “into a new quality”: the collective phenomenon of the brain's self-experience. This self-referential and self-observing quality we have in mind is capable of (recursively) observing its self-observations, i.e., interpreting change that is meaningful in relation to itself. The notion of self-interpretation embodies the idea of a “hermeneutic circle”, that is, (in interpretation (...)
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  • Subjekt und selbstmodell. Die perspektivität phänomenalen bewußtseins vor dem hintergrund einer naturalistischen theorie mentaler repräsentation.Thomas K. Metzinger - 1999 - In 自我隧道 自我的新哲学 从神经科学到意识伦理学.
    This book contains a representationalist theory of self-consciousness and of the phenomenal first-person perspective. It draws on empirical data from the cognitive and neurosciences.
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  • Is consciousness integrated?Max Velmans - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):229-230.
    In the visual system, the represented features of individual objects (shape, colour, movement, and so on) are distributed both in space and time within the brain. Representations of inner and outer event sequences arrive through different sense organs at different times, and are likewise distributed. Objects are nevertheless perceived as integrated wholes - and event sequences are experienced to form a coherent "consciousness stream." In their thoughtful article, Dennett & Kinsbourne ask how this is achieved.
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  • Brain stimulation and conscious experience.Daniel A. Pollen - 2004 - Consciousness and Cognition 13 (3):626-645.
    Libet discovered that a substantial duration (> 0.5-1.0 s) of direct electrical stimulation of the surface of the somatosensory cortex at threshold currents is required before human subjects can report that a conscious somatosensory experience had occurred. Using a reaction time method we confirm that a similarly long stimulation duration at threshold currents is required for activation of elementary visual experiences (phosphenes) in human subjects following stimulation of the surface of the striate cortex. However, the reaction times for the subject (...)
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  • Time Factors in Conscious Processes: Reply to Gilberto Gomes.Benjamin Libet - 2000 - Consciousness and Cognition 9 (1):1-12.
    The critical reinterpretations of Libet's research by G. Gomes make speculative, unwarranted, and untested assumptions. These assumptions and arguments are analyzed and their status relative to Libet's findings is criticized.
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  • Ambiguities in the subjective timing of experiences debate.Ronald C. Hoy - 1982 - Philosophy of Science 49 (June):254-262.
    Some recent physiological data indicate that the “subjective timing” of experiences can be “automatically referred backwards in time” to represent a sequence of events even though the earlier portions of associated neurophysiological activity are themselves insufficient to elicit the experience of any sensation. The challenge, then, is to explain how subjects can experience what they do in the reported ways when, if one looked just at certain neurophysiological activity, it would seem that perhaps subjects should report their sensations differently. The (...)
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  • Time and consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):220-221.
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  • A puzzle concerning time perception.Robin le Poidevin - 2004 - Synthese 142 (1):109-142.
    According to a plausible and influential account of perceptual knowledge, the truth-makers of beliefs that constitute perceptual knowledge must feature in the causal explanation of how we acquire those beliefs. However, this account runs into difficulties when it tries to accommodate time perception -- specifically perception of order and duration -- since the features we are apparently tracking in such perception are not causal. The central aim of the paper is to solve this epistemological puzzle. Two strategies are examined. The (...)
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