Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Creature Features: Character Production and Failed Explanations in Fiction, Folklore, and Theorizing.Chris Tillman & Joshua Spencer - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-26.
    Fictional realism is the view that creatures of fiction exist. Mythical realism is the view that creatures of myth and mistaken theories exist. Call the combined view “Ecumenical Realism.” We critically evaluate three arguments for Ecumenical Realism and argue they are unsound because fictional storytelling differs from mistaken theorizing in important ways. We think these considerations support a more conservative view, “Sectarian Realism,” which results from subtracting “creatures of mistaken theorizing” from Ecumenical Realism. We close by considering an important challenge (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • How to Pick Out a Dragon: Fiction and the Selection Problem.Fredrik Haraldsen - 2020 - Topoi 39 (2):401-412.
    Non-actualist theories promise straightforward accounts of meaning, truth and reference of fictional discourse but are ostensibly saddled with a Selection Problem, that multiple possible candidates satisfy the role-descriptions associated with names used in fictions and no principled way to distinguish between them; yet if names are referential, there can only be one referent. The problem is often taken to be a serious—even decisive—obstacle for non-actualism, and the aim of this article is to show that the challenge can be met. I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Extraordinary Impossibility of Sherlock Holmes.Ben Caplan - 2016 - Res Philosophica 93 (2):335-355.
    In an addendum to Naming and Necessity, Saul Kripke argues against his earlier view that Sherlock Holmes is a possible person. In this paper, I suggest a nonstandard interpretation of the addendum. A key feature of this non-standard interpretation is that it attempts to make sense of why Kripke would be rejecting the view that Sherlock Holmes is a possible person without asserting that it is not the case that Sherlock Holmes is a possible person.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations