The teachings of Madhyamaka have been the basis of Tibetan Buddhist thought and practice since the eighth century. After the twelfth century, Tibetan scholars distinguished two branches of Madhyamaka: Autonomist and Consequentialist. What distinctions in Madhyamaka thought and practice did twelfth century Tibetan scholars make to differentiate these two branches? This article focuses upon a newly identified twelfth century Tibetan manuscript on Madhyamaka from the Collected Works of the Kadampas: Khu lo tsā ba’s Treatise. Khu lo tsā ba, also known (...) as Khu ston Mdo sde ’bar, was a contemporary of Jayānanda and Pa tshab Lo tsā ba Nyi ma grags and instrumental for the revitalized reception of Madhyamaka in twelfth century Tibet. Khu lo tsā ba’s Treatise outlines a multifaceted understanding of Madhyamaka as the work solely focuses upon the distinctions between Autonomist and Consequentialist Mādhyamikas. The paper outlines the structure and content of the Treatise and identifies six topics that the author emphasizes to distinguish Autonomist and Consequentialist branches of Madhyamaka. Based on an overview of these topics, the paper concludes that the Autonomist/Consequentialist distinction of Madhyamaka was already well developed in twelfth century Tibet and involved a differential of systems that encompassed much more than distinct styles of logical proof. (shrink)

The paper discusses the Tangut translation of the famous Entry into Two Truths. This composition by Atiśa was important in the formation of the doctrinal system of the Tangut Buddhism. The paper examines the possible variations of the source text of the Tangut translation, its relationship with the texts on valid cognition. The paper discusses the possible division of the text and provides the translation of the Tangut version and compares it with the Tibetan original.

An earlier article (Apple, J Indian Philos 41(3): 263–329, 2013) identified for the first time a brief Tibetan commentary to Atiśa Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna’s (982–1054 c.e.) well-known “Entry to the Two Realities” (Satyadvayāvatāra) and provided an annotated translation of the work. This article provides an annotated diplomatic edition of the Tibetan commentary. The manuscript of the commentary is a facsimile reprint located in the recently published “Collected Works of the Bka’-gdams-pas” (bka’ gdams gsung ’bum). The early Tibetan commentary to Atiśa’s Satyadvayāvatāra provides (...) direct textual evidence of the beginnings of scholasticism in Tibet and offers an early perspective on the formative developments in the intellectual history of Tibetan Madhyamaka. (shrink)

Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna (982–1054 c.e.), more commonly known under his honorific title of Atiśa, is a renowned figure in Tibetan Buddhist cultural memory. He is famous for coming to Tibet and revitalizing Buddhism there during the early eleventh century. Of the many works that Atiśa composed, translated, and brought to Tibet one of the most well-known was his “Entry to the Two Realities” (Satyadvayāvatāra). Recent scholarship has provided translations and Tibetan editions of this work, including Lindtner’s English translation (1981) and Ejima’s Japanese (...) translation (1983). However, previously there was no known Indian or Tibetan commentary to this work. This article identifies for the first time a brief commentary to the Satyadvayāvatāra and discusses its content and purport in relation to early Madhyamaka philosophy in Tibet, and provides an annotated translation of the work. This early Tibetan commentary on the two realities (satyadvaya) provides important insight into how late eleventh century or early twelfth centuries Tibetan followers of Atiśa understood the tenets of Buddhist philosophy, the nature of valid cognition (tshad ma), and the importance of spiritual authority. The early Tibetan commentary to Atiśa’s Satyadvayāvatāra provides direct textual evidence of the beginnings of scholasticism in Tibet and offers an early perspective on the formative developments in the intellectual history of Tibetan Madhyamaka. (shrink)

It is argued that early Buddhism to a very considerable extent can and should be seen as reformed Brahmanism. Speculations about cosmogony in Buddhist s tras can be traced back to Vedic sources, above all R gveda 10.129 & 10.90—two hymns that play a similar fundamental role in the early Upanisads. Like the immortal and unmanifest Brahman and the mortal and manifest Brahm, the Buddha, as a mythological Bhagavat, also had two forms. In his highest form he is “the profound” (...) beyond being and non-being, like Brahman. As a teacher, he is like Brahm. By suppressing mind and by getting rid of desire a Buddhist should “swim” back to the profound beyond the duality of life and death, which is also suffering. One becomes real and true by seeing the causal identity of tat and tvam, i.e. of macrocosm and microcosm. The spiritual ideals of early Buddhism are thus founded on natural philosophy. (shrink)

This paper proposes an interpretation of Nāgārjuna’s doctrine of the two truths that considers saṃvṛti and paramārtha-satya two visions of reality on which the Buddhas, for soteriological and pedagogical reasons, build teachings of two types: respectively in agreement with (for example, the teaching of the Four Noble Truths) or in contrast to (for example, the teaching of emptiness) the category of svabhāva. The early sections of the article show to what extent the various current interpretations of the Nāgārjunian doctrine of (...) the dve satye—despite their sometimes even macroscopic differences—have a common tendency to consider the notion of śūnyatā as a teaching not based on, but equivalent to supreme truth. This equivalence—philologically questionable—leads to interpretative paths that prove inevitably aporetic: indeed, according to whether the interpretation of śūnyatā is ‘metaphysical’ or ‘anti-metaphysical’, it gives rise to readings of Nāgārjuna’s thought incompatible, respectively, with anti-metaphysical and realistic types of verses traceable in the works of the author of the Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā (MMK). On the contrary, by giving more emphasis to the expression samupāśritya (“based on”), which recurs in MMK.24.8, and therefore, by epistemologically separating the notion of śūnyatā from the notion of paramārtha-satya (and of some of its conceptual equivalents such as nirvāṇa, tattva and dharmatā), we may obtain an interpretation—at once realistic and anti-metaphysical—of the theory of the two truths compatible with the vast majority (or even totality) of Nāgārjuna’s verses. (shrink)

The Dalai Lama is fond of quoting a verse attributed to the Buddha to the effect that as the wise examine carefully gold by burning, cutting and polishing it, so the Buddha's followers should embrace his words after examining them critically and not just out of respect for the Master. A role for critical thought has been accepted by all Buddhists, although during two and a half millennia of sophisticated doctrinal development the exact nature, role and range of critical thought (...) has been extensively debated. In general doctrinal difference in Buddhism has been seen as perfectly acceptable, reflecting different levels of understanding and therefore different stages on the path to enlightenment. Buddhism has tended not to look to or expect doctrinal orthodoxy, although there has always been a much stronger impetus towards orthopraxy, and common code and behaviour has perhaps played a comparable role in Buddhism to common belief and creed in some other religions. Nevertheless an acceptability of doctrinal divergence has not lessened the energy and vigour devoted to lengthy and sometimes fiercely polemical debate between teachers and schools. This was nowhere more so than in Tibet, where doctrinal debates—sometimes lasting all night—to the present day form the central part of a monastic education in most of the largest Tibetan monastic universities. (shrink)

The aim of the present study is to shed light on why the citation taken from Saraha’s Dohākośagīti and occurring in the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa, chapter 7, opens the door to some fundamental reflections concerning the authority and the “nature” of this latter text. On the basis of a historical and doctrinal analysis, here a new interpretation is put forward, according to which the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa should be considered a tenth century CE handbook, written by some unknown Buddhist teacher perhaps as a manual (...) for his lessons. The primary purpose of this teacher seems to have been the discussion—in the light of textual sources compiled up to this time—of the doctrinal and philosophical perspectives contained in the sixth century CE Bhāviveka’s Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā and Tarkajvālā. The Madhyamakaratnapradīpa could have been composed on the basis of notes written down for the benefit of this teacher’s students. Moreover, the analysis of the general style and quotes or references of the text, on the one hand, compared with the passage containing the quote from Saraha, on the other hand, lead us to take seriously into consideration the possibility that the citation borrowed from the Dohākośagīti could have been embedded into the text a little after its composition, by someone different from its original author. (shrink)

Although Atiśa is famous for his journey to Tibet and his teaching there, his teachings of Madhyamaka are not extensively commented upon in the works of known and extant indigenous Tibetan scholars. Atiśa’s Madhyamaka thought, if even discussed, is minimally acknowledged in recent modern scholarly overviews or sourcebooks on Indian Buddhist thought. The following annotated translation provides a late eleventh century Indo-Tibetan Madhyamaka teaching on the two realities attributed to Atiśa Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna entitled A General Explanation of, and Framework for Understanding, (...) the Two Realities. The text furnishes an exposition of the Middle Way thought of Nāgārjuna based on an exegesis of conventional reality and ultimate reality within the framework of Mahāyāna path structures found in texts attributed to Maitreyanātha. The General Explanation fills an important gap in the historical knowledge of Madhyamaka teachings in eleventh century India and Tibet. The text presents a Madhyamaka teaching brought to Tibet by Atiśa and provides previously unknown evidence for the type of pure Madhyamaka teachings that circulated among the communities of early followers of Atiśa. These teachings were disseminated before the rise of the early Bka’-gdams-pa monastery of Gsang-phu ne’u-thog and its debating traditions that, particularly beginning in the twelfth century, placed emphasis on the merger of Madhyamaka and Epistemology. (shrink)