The third and final installment of this book-length contribution to the Common Knowledge symposium “Contextualism—the Next Generation” treats two further writers in seventeenth-century England whose work is not representative of any stance or discourse that contextualist historians have recognized as available in that era. In Aemelia Lanyer's poetry, we find a resistance to established perspectives that is related to her sense that divine signification is always incomplete and that, therefore, the diffidence of female cognition is superior, when approaching religious texts, (...) to the assertive mentality that she associates with men. Despite his sex, however, and his reputation for theological and political radicalism, Milton too explicitly contends that the interpretation of scripture should always be “non-committal” because its signification is always incomplete. The “very magnitude” of the “great mystery” of the Incarnation, Milton argues in De Doctrina Christiana, should encourage the reader's mind to stand on “guard from the outset” against the tendency to make “rash or hasty assertions.” The urge to tamper with, pry into, add to, or hasten to understand the signifiers of divine meaning is shown, in Paradise Lost, to be the original sin of the first human couple. As much as for Lanyer, then, sex is for Milton bound up with hermeneutics—and, for both poets, the individual's relationship with God is a consuming passion, about which one may report a phenomenology of affects but can offer no contentions or arguments. (shrink)

Those of us who are captivated by new television, often find ourselves rewatching episodes or whole series. Why? What is the philosophical significance of the phenomenon of rewatching? In what follows, I engage with the ontology of television series in order to think about these questions around rewatching. I conclude by reflecting on what the entire discussion might suggest about the medium of new television, about ourselves, and also about our world and the possibilities of art in it.

Cet article se propose d’analyser la notion d’exercice telle qu’elle est pensée dans les traités d’art maniéristes de la seconde moitié du XVIe siècle en Italie ; il procède à une reconstitution des théories de l’exercice ainsi qu’à une explicitation de leurs sources philosophiques (aristotélisme, néoplatonisme…). Pour les maniéristes, l’art est une disposition subjective qui s’acquiert par l’habitude ; la pratique du dessin est supposée apporter à l’artiste une aisance qui concerne autant sa dextérité manuelle que l’acuité de son jugement. (...) En acquérant un « jugement de l’œil », l’artiste doit apprendre à « savoir voir », afin de pouvoir adapter les règles générales aux situations particulières les plus complexes, comme l’homme prudent d’Aristote. Le dessin, en particulier, est l’occasion pour l’artiste d’affiner et d’enrichir son regard en corrigeant ses erreurs. La grâce, qui est une « facilità nella difficoltà » censée émanée de cette pratique assidue du dessin, implique en outre une forme d’authenticité par rapport à soi-même, l’artiste respectant et cultivant ses tendances naturelles et personnelles. C’est dans ce contexte, où l’art devient vertu et engage la vie entière de celui qui le pratique, que l’exercice du dessin devient un exercice de soi, par lequel l’artiste se forme, se questionne, se perfectionne. (shrink)

Attempts in antiquity and the Middle Ages to determine the mathematical law of refraction are well known. In view of the movement toward the mathematization of physical laws, which has made great gains since the beginning of the seventeenth century, and of the efforts of Hariot, Kepler, Snell, and Descartes to determine the true mathematical ratio between the angles of incidence and refraction, it is understandable that historians of pre-seventeenth-century science should concentrate on the quantitative aspects of refraction. But to (...) do so is to gain a distorted picture of early optical thought, for as much effort was actually devoted to understanding the cause of refraction as to finding the mathematical law of refraction. (shrink)

My goal in this paper is to contribute to the literature on Roger Bacon's epistemology by focusing on the issue of perception of quantity. The reading I aim to substantiate is that Bacon's account is best understood in terms of indirect realism. I call it indirect realism because although we have access to quantities as they exist in nature, the account is mediated by the use of a quasi-syllogism. The quasi-syllogism is constructed based on three inputs, the species of the (...) eye, colour, and light. To defend this reading I follow five steps. First, I analyse the importance of quantity in perception, and then, in steps two and three, I look at Bacon's theory of perception from its two sides, extramission and intromission. In the fourth step I look at the quasi-syllogisms that mediate cognition of quantities, and in the fifth and final step, I draw all the threads together and make the case for Bacon's indirect realism of quantity perception. (shrink)