Citations of:
Possible worlds semantics and the liar: Reflections on a problem posed by Kaplan
In Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), The Philosophy of David Kaplan. Oxford University Press (2009)
Add citations
You must login to add citations.


A new puzzle of modal recombination is presented which relies purely on resources of firstorder modal logic. It shows that naive recombinatorial reasoning, which has previously been shown to be inconsistent with various assumptions concerning propositions, sets and classes, leads to inconsistency by itself. The context sensitivity of modal expressions is suggested as the source of the puzzle, and it is argued that it gives us reason to reconsider the assumption that the notion of metaphysical necessity is in good standing. 

This thesis comprises three main chapters—each comprising one relatively standalone paper. The unifying theme is fragmentalism about truth, which is the view that the predicate “true” either expresses distinct concepts or expresses distinct properties. / In Chapter 1, I provide a formal development of alethic pluralism. Pluralism is the view that there are distinct truth properties associated with distinct domains of subject matter, where a truth property satisfies certain truthcharacterizing principles. On behalf of pluralists, I propose an account of logic (...) 

The issue of reduction of propositions to sets of possible worlds is addressed. It is shown that, under some natural assumptions, there always exist recursive propositions, i.e. decidable sets of possible worlds, which are not assigned to any sentence of a language. Some consequences of this result are discussed. 