This is the second part of a two-part article on compositionality, i.e. the principle that the meaning of a complex expression is determined by the meanings of its parts and the way they are put together. In the first, Pagin and Westerståhl (2010), we provide a general historical background, a formal framework, definitions, and a survey of variants of compositionality. It will be referred to as Part I. Here we discuss arguments for and against the claim that natural languages have (...) a compositional semantics. We also discuss some problem cases, including belief reports, quotation, idioms, and ambiguity. (shrink)

1. 1. PROGRAM It will be our aim to reconstruct, with precision, certain views which have been traditionally associated with nominalism and to investigate problems arising from these views in the construction of interpreted formal systems. Several such systems are developed in accordance with the demand that the sentences of a system which is acceptable to a nominalist must not imply the existence of any entities other than individuals. Emphasis will be placed on the constructionist method of philosophical analysis. To (...) follow this method is to introduce the central notions of the subject-matter to be investigated into a system governed by exact rules. For example, the constructionist method of investigating the properties of geometric figures may consist in formulating a system of postulates and definitions which, together with the apparatus of formal logic, generates all necessary truths concerning geometric figures. Similarly, a constructionist analysis of the notion of an individual may take the form of an axiomatic theory whose provable assertions are just those which seem essential to the role played by the concept of an individual in system atic contexts. Such axiomatic theories gain in interest if they are supple mented by precise semantical rules specifying the denotation of all terms and the truth conditions of all sentences of the theory. (shrink)

At least in one well-motivated sense of ‘concept’, all perception involves concepts, even perception as practiced by lizards and bees. That is because—the paper argues—all perception involves belief.

The article first rehearses three deflationary theories of reference, (1) disquotationalism, (2) propositionalism (Horwich), and (3) the anaphoric theory (Brandom), and raises a number of objections against them. It turns out that each corresponds to a closely related theory of truth, and that these are subject to analogous criticisms to a surprisingly high extent. I then present a theory of my own, according to which the schema “That S(t) is about t” and the biconditional “S refers to x iff S (...) says something about x” are exhaustive of the notions of aboutness and reference. An account of the usefulness of “about” is then given, which, I argue, is superior to that of Horwich. I close with a few considerations about how the advertised theory relates to well-known issues of reference, the conclusions of which is (1) that the issues concern reference and aboutness only insofar as the words “about” and “refer” serve to generalise over the claims that are really at issue, (2) that the theory of reference will not settle the issues, and (3) that it follows from (2) that the issues do not concern the nature of aboutness or reference. (shrink)

It is widely accepted that physicalism faces its most serious challenge when it comes to making room for the phenomenal character of psychological experience, its so-called what-it-is-like aspect. The challenge has surfaced repeatedly over the past two decades in a variety of forms. In a particularly striking one, Frank Jackson considers a situation in which Mary, a brilliant scientist who knows all the physical facts there are to know about psychological experience, has spent the whole of her life in a (...) black and white room. He asks, What will happen when Mary is released from her black and white room or is given a colour television monitor? Will she learn anything or not? It seems just obvious that she will learn something about the world and our visual experience of it. But then it is inescapable that her previous knowledge was incomplete. But she had all the physical information. (Jackson 1986: 130). (shrink)

Notice that each of (1)–(4) is an instance of a more general pattern. For example, we could replace ‘black’ in (1) with any of a wide range of other adjectives such as ‘furry’ or ‘hungry’ or ‘three-legged’, without rendering the entailment invalid or any less obvious. Similarly, there are a number of verbs that occur in entailments parallel to (3): ‘Moe boiled the water; so the water boiled’; ‘Bart blew up the school; so the school blew up’; ‘Homer sank the (...) boat; so the boat sank’ and so on. (shrink)

We present a procedure which allows us to recover classical and nonclassical logical structures as concrete logics associated with physical theories expressed by means of classical languages. This procedure consists in choosing, for a given theory ${{\mathcal{T}}}$ and classical language ${{\fancyscript{L}}}$ expressing ${{\mathcal{T}}, }$ an observative sublanguage L of ${{\fancyscript{L}}}$ with a notion of truth as correspondence, introducing in L a derived and theory-dependent notion of C-truth (true with certainty), defining a physical preorder $\prec$ induced by C-truth, and finally selecting (...) a set of sentences ϕ V that are verifiable (or testable) according to ${{\mathcal{T}}, }$ on which a weak complementation ⊥ is induced by ${{\mathcal{T}}. }$ The triple $(\phi_{V},\prec,^{\perp})$ is then the desired concrete logic. By applying this procedure we recover a classical logic and a standard quantum logic as concrete logics associated with classical and quantum mechanics, respectively. The latter result is obtained in a purely formal way, but it can be provided with a physical meaning by adopting a recent interpretation of quantum mechanics that reinterprets quantum probabilities as conditional on detection rather than absolute. Hence quantum logic can be considered as a mathematical structure formalizing the properties of the notion of verification in quantum physics. This conclusion supports the general idea that some nonclassical logics can coexist without conflicting with classical logic (global pluralism) because they formalize metalinguistic notions that do not coincide with the notion of truth as correspondence but are not alternative to it either. (shrink)

Nelson Goodman's proposal for a reconception of meaning consists in replacing the absolute notion ofsameness of meaning by that oflikeness of meaning (with respect to pertinent contexts). According to this view, synonymy is a matter of degree (of interreplaceability) with identity of expression as a limiting case. Goodman's demonstration that no two expressions are exactly alike in meaning is shown to be unsuccessful. Although it does not make use of quotational contexts for the test of interreplaceability, it is tantamount to (...) their acceptance. Goodman rejects quotational contexts; I argue that they should be accepted. This move offers two advantages.Firstly, and mainly, it allows interlinguistic comparison of meaning, something that has not been deemed possible in the received version of Goodman's account.Secondly, it restores the full scale of likeness of meaning damaged by the renunciation of those contexts that guarantee difference in meaning for diverse expressions. (shrink)

A free logical analysis of singular terms couched in terms of the semantic theory of Keenan and Faltz is shown to avoid problems with both Frege's and Russell's treatments. At its heart is the proposal of Keenan and Faltz to reverse the usual mode-theoretic conception of individuals and properties, taking the latter as primitive and the former as derived therefrom. A simple extension of the notion 'property' is then shown to enable a parallel treatment of definite generics.

La notion phénoménologique d'intentionnalité suscite certaines énigmes philosophiques assez déroutantes concernant par exemple l'existence d'entités relationnelles ou le statut des objets intentionnels. Il est ici suggéré que ces énigmes, apparemment ontologiques, auraient plus de chances d'être élucidées si elles étaient considérées comme des problèmes sémantiques concernant cette catégorie spéciale d'énoncés que l'on appelle énoncés intensionnels ». Elles pourraient alors être discutées à l'aide de méthodes plus précises comme celles de Carnap, Church ou Quine.The phenomenological notion of intentionality raises a number (...) of rather perplexing philosophical riddles, for instance about the existence of relational entities or about the status of intentional objects. The paper suggests that these seemingly ontological riddles would gain more chances to be elucidated if they were regarded as semantic problems about a special kind of statements called "intensional statements". Thus they could be discussed with the help of some more precise methods such as those of Carnap, Church or Quine. (shrink)