In light of the recent revival of the debate on radical democracy, this paper seeks to show how a critical reappropriation of Chantal Mouffe’s theory of agonistic politics can explain the structure of a conflict-based understanding of democratic orders. In explicit convergence with Mouffe, I argue that a radical democratic project by no means needs to abandon—as many absolute democracy and multitude theorists claim—the modern political paradigm. I also show, diverging from her account, that Mouffe’s defence of a radical democratic (...) project based on pluralism and agonism would have been better served by a critical reception of Arendt’s thinking rather than that of Schmitt. The relevance of this alternative strategy—so I will argue—lies in the fact that it delivers an apt design for a politico-legal order which permits true and proper conflicts, on the one hand, while simultaneously allowing that they be dealt with democratically, on the other. (shrink)

The question addressed by this article is whether a form of constituent power exists at the EU level. It is argued that European integration has not suppressed the idea of people as constituent power. Instead, the idea of ‘people’ has been constructed through the discourses of security and rights. Ever since the early stages of European integration, the security and rights discourses have consisted in the articulation of a meta-constitutional rationale, which is here called the ‘security of the European project’, (...) i.e. a form of political morality that is pursued by the EU as a polity over time and aims at its own survival. Security and rights discourses have contributed to constructing two ideas of ‘people-as-constituent-power’. The first idea is that of ‘mobile people’, i.e. people exercising EU free movement rights. The second idea is that of ‘peoples’ in the plural, conceived as States and citizens at the same time. Nevertheless, these discourses are characterised by a certain degree of ambiguity and have been unrolling as if the development of the EU polity was a mere technical, neutral matter. This state of affairs cannot continue: the European project has always been a political project, and, as integration reaches its more advanced stages, the time has come to disclose its political nature and address conflict openly. (shrink)

This paper is a critical notice of Philip Pettit's On the People's Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy. Pettit argues that only Republicanism can respond appropriately to the ‘evil of subjection to another's will – particularly in important areas of personal choice’ because its ideal of liberty – freedom as non-domination – both captures better than liberalism our commitment to individual liberty and explains better our commitment to the legitimacy of democratic decision-making than standard democrat accounts. If this (...) argument succeeds, it demonstrates that there is no real tension between the liberal thought that justice provides a standard for evaluating public decisions independent of the fact that they are taken democratically and the democratic thought that the fact that a decision is democratic suffices to make it legitimate. I argue, however, that Pettit finds himself caught between two contradictory positions: a version of Isaiah Berlin's negative concept of liberty and a positive liberty account of democracy. And I show that his attempt to resolve the tension fails because it requires him to embrace the positive liberty account he is committed to rejecting. (shrink)