Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Specialization Effect and Its Influence on Memory and Problem Solving in Expert Chess Players.Merim Bilalić, Peter McLeod & Fernand Gobet - 2009 - Cognitive Science 33 (6):1117-1143.
    Expert chess players, specialized in different openings, recalled positions and solved problems within and outside their area of specialization. While their general expertise was at a similar level, players performed better with stimuli from their area of specialization. The effect of specialization on both recall and problem solving was strong enough to override general expertise—players remembering positions and solving problems from their area of specialization performed at around the level of players 1 standard deviation (SD) above them in general skill. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Dynamic sets of potentially interchangeable connotations: A theory of mental objects.Alexandre Linhares - 2008 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (4):389-390.
    Analogy-making is an ability with which we can abstract from surface similarities and perceive deep, meaningful similarities between different mental objects and situations. I propose that mental objects are dynamically changing sets of potentially interchangeable connotations. Unfortunately, most models of analogy seem devoid of both semantics and relevance-extraction, postulating analogy as a one-to-one mapping devoid of connotation transfer.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • How Can Experts See the Invisible? Reply to Bilalić and Gobet.Alexandre Linhares & Paulo Brum - 2009 - Cognitive Science 33 (5):748-751.
    Experts in all fields are able to see what is invisible to others. Experts are also able to see what is visible to all—and this is explored by Bilalić and Gobet. We question the method of normalizing all subjects in an experimental condition, and asking experts to behave as if they were novices. We claim that method leads Bilalić and Gobet to a nonsequitur.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • They Do What They Are Told to Do: The Influence of Instruction on (Chess) Expert Perception—Commentary on Linhares and Brum (2007).Merim Bilalić & Fernand Gobet - 2009 - Cognitive Science 33 (5):743-747.
    Linhares and Brum (2007) argue that they provide evidence for analogy as the main principle behind experts’ acquisition of perceptual knowledge. However, the methodology they used—asking players to pair positions using abstract similarity—raises the possibility that the task reflects more the effect of directional instructions than the principles underlying the acquisition of knowledge. Here we replicate and extend Linhares and Brum’s experiment and show that the matching task they used is inadequate for drawing any conclusions about the nature of experts’ (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Sparse distributed memory: understanding the speed and robustness of expert memory.Marcelo S. Brogliato, Daniel M. Chada & Alexandre Linhares - 2014 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Analogy as relational priming: The challenge of self-reflection.Andrea Cheshire, Linden J. Ball & Charlie N. Lewis - 2008 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (4):381-382.
    Despite its strengths, Leech et al.'s model fails to address the important benefits that derive from self-explanation and task feedback in analogical reasoning development. These components encourage explicit, self-reflective processes that do not necessarily link to knowledge accretion. We wonder, therefore, what mechanisms can be included within a connectionist framework to model self-reflective involvement and its beneficial consequences.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Developing structured representations.Leonidas A. A. Doumas & Lindsey E. Richland - 2008 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (4):384-385.
    Leech et al.'s model proposes representing relations as primed transformations rather than as structured representations (explicit representations of relations and their roles dynamically bound to fillers). However, this renders the model unable to explain several developmental trends (including relational integration and all changes not attributable to growth in relational knowledge). We suggest looking to an alternative computational model that learns structured representations from examples.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark