There are two standing, incompatible accounts of Descartes’ contributions to the study of psychosomatic phenomena that pervade histories of medicine, psychology, and psychiatry. The first views Descartes as the father of “rational psychology” a tradition that defines the soul as a thinking, unextended substance. The second account views Descartes as the father of materialism and the machine metaphor. The consensus is that Descartes’ studies of optics and motor reflexes and his conception of the body-machine metaphor made early and important contributions (...) to physiology and neuroscience but otherwise his impact was minimal. These predominately negative assessments of Descartes’ contributions give a false impression of the role his philosophy played in the development of medicine and psychiatry in seventeenth-century France and beyond. I explore Descartes’ influence in the little-known writings of a doctor from Toulouse, and . A study of Bayle gives us occasion to rethink the nature and role of psychosomatic explanation in Descartes’ philosophy. The portrait I present is of a Cartesian science that had an actual and lasting effect on medical science and practice, and may offer something of value to practitioners today. (shrink)

Descartes has a Clarity First epistemology: (i) Clarity is a primitive (indefinable) phenomenal quality: the appearance of truth. (ii) Clarity is prior to other qualities: obscurity, confusion, distinctness – are defined in terms of clarity; epistemic goods – reason to assent, rational inclination to assent, reliability, and knowledge – are explained by clarity. (This is the first of two companion entries; the sequel is called, "Descartes's Method for Achieving Knowledge.").

Descartes’ theory of the passions has important connections to his view that nonhuman animals are automata. In this paper, I show how critics of animal automatism exploited these connections. I int...

Walter Charleton’s often overlooked treatise, The Natural History of the Passions (1674), offers an eclectic and unique engagement in the seventeenth-century debate about the nature and purpose of...

This paper argues that a proper understanding of the epistemological and metaphysical issue of dualism can only be attained through a thoroughgoing analysis of human emotion. Indeed, it is no coincidence that three main thinkers on dualism, whether they were apparent proponents, opponents, or had a somewhat ambiguous status, were also heavily involved in understanding emotion. Ultimately, a proper comprehension of emotion shows the issue of dualism to be moot when it comes to our pre-reflective, everyday lives; dualism is a (...) theoretical interest that shows how we must necessarily posit two essential realms – one of nature and one of consciousness – that are nevertheless always already entwined in pre-reflective and immediately lived experiences like emotion. In this manner, a proper understanding of emotion shows that dualism is not an issue on the everyday lived level, but certainly is on epistemological and metaphysical ones. On these levels, dualism is an essential tool that must be understood and used properly if one is to give a thoroughgoing account of human nature from a theoretical standpoint, where avoiding conflations between immediate and reflective experiences, as well as first-person and third-person standpoints, is crucial. Here, one needs to be aware not only of our dual nature of matter and mind, but also of our dual – which is to say scientific and phenomenological ways – of tackling theoretical problems. In short, one may give a proper, dynamic account of human emotion and simultaneously recognize the advantage of thinking in dual – but not “dualistic” – registers. (shrink)

In general outline, Astell's A Serious Proposal to the Ladies is well understood. In Part I, Astell argues that women are educable, and she proposes the construction of a women's academy. In Part II, she proposes a method for the improvement of the mind. In this article, I reconstruct and contextualize Astell's arguments and proposals within her theory of mind and her account of the skeptical predicament that she sees as being endemic among women. I argue that Astell's two proposals (...) are best understood as strategies that, when employed, will allow women to critique prejudice and custom. (shrink)