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The Polysemy View of Pain

Mind and Language 38 (1):198-217 (2021)

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  1. Experimental Philosophy of Consciousness.Kevin Reuter - 2020 - In Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), The Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    Experimental philosophy of consciousness aims to investigate and explain our thinking about phenomenally conscious states. Based on empirical studies, researchers have argued (a) that we lack a folk concept of consciousness, (b) that we do not think entities like Microsoft feel regret, (c) that unfelt pains are widely accepted, and (d) that people do not attribute phenomenally conscious states to duplicated hamsters. In this article, I review these and other intriguing claims about people’s understanding of phenomenal consciousness. In doing so, (...)
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  • How to Think about Zeugmatic Oddness.Michelle Liu - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-24.
    Zeugmatic oddness is a linguistic intuition of oddness with respect to an instance of zeugma, i.e. a sentence containing an instance of a homonymous or polysemous word being used in different meanings or senses simultaneously. Zeugmatic oddness is important for philosophical debates as philosophers often use it to argue that a particular philosophically interesting expression is ambiguous and that the phenomenon referred to by the expression is disunified. This paper takes a closer look at zeugmatic oddness. Focusing on relevant psycholinguistic (...)
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  • Ambiguity Tests, Polysemy, and Copredication.David Liebesman & Ofra Magidor - 2024 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (3):551-560.
    A family of familiar linguistic tests purport to help identify when a term is ambiguous. These tests are philosophically important: a familiar philosophical strategy is to claim that some phenomenon is disunified and its accompanying term is ambiguous. The tests have been used to evaluate disunification proposals about causation, pain, and knowledge, among others. -/- These ambiguity tests, however, have come under fire. It has been alleged that the tests fail for polysemy, a common type of ambiguity, and one that (...)
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  • Pain Linguistics: A Case for Pluralism.Sabrina Coninx, Pascale Willemsen & Kevin Https://Orcidorg Reuter - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (1):145-168.
    The most common approach to understanding the semantics of the concept of pain is third-person thought experiments. By contrast, the most frequent and most relevant uses of the folk concept of pain are from a first-person perspective in conversational settings. In this paper, we use a set of linguistic tools to systematically explore the semantics of what people communicate when reporting pain from a first-person perspective. Our results suggest that only a pluralistic view can do justice to the way we (...)
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  • The Compact Compendium of Experimental Philosophy.Alexander Max Bauer & Stephan Kornmesser (eds.) - 2023 - Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter.
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  • Somatosensation and the first person.Carlota Serrahima - 2024 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 15:51-68.
    Experientialism about the sense of bodily ownership is the view that there is something it is like to feel a body as one’s own. In this paper I argue for a particular experientialist thesis. I first present a puzzle about the relation between bodily awareness and self-consciousness, and introduce a somewhat underappreciated view on the sense of bodily ownership, Implicit Reflexivity, that points us in the right direction as to how to address this puzzle. I argue that Implicit Reflexivity, however, (...)
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  • Sharing Pain: A Hybrid Expressivist Account.Jada Wiggleton-Little - 2024 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (3):608-622.
    When one communicates that they are in pain, it is often assumed that the speaker is providing an assertion or report. Call this the cognitivist stance of pain utterances. Nevertheless, many sentential pain utterances seem to have both assertive and imperatival communicative content in virtue of expressing both the speaker's pain belief and the pain experience, respectively. I call this view hybrid expressivism about pain. In this paper, I take the imperativist idea of pain seriously and show that, via an (...)
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  • Reducing pain: New approaches, new possibilities, and new ways of understanding the brain.Hardcastle Valerie Gray - 2023 - Belgrade Philosophical Annual 36 (2):7-24.
    In 2020, the International Association for the Study of Pain (IASP) changed its definition of pain to just an "an unpleasant sensory and emotional experience. " Since then, several philosophers have attempted to reaffirm the impossibility of reducing pain to neurobiology from a variety of approaches, including eliminativism, multiple realizability, and intersubjectivity. All of their arguments assume that there are no specific biomarkers for pain. I adumbrate a more ecumenical path: that while these approaches have some merit, they also misstate (...)
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