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Ramsey's theory of belief and truth

Brian Loar

In David Hugh Mellor (ed.), Prospects for Pragmatism: Essays in Memory of F P Ramsey. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 49--69 (1980)

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Ramsey on saying and whistling: A discordant note.Richard Holton & Huw Price - 2003 - Noûs 37 (2):325–341.details In 'General Propositions and Causality' Ramsey rejects his earlier view that universal generalizations are infinite conjunctions, arguing that they are not genuine propositions at all. We argue that his new position is unstable. The issues about infinity that lead Ramsey to the new view are essentially those underlying Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations. If they show that generalizations are not genuine propositions, they show that there are no genuine propositions. The connection raises interesting historical questions about the direction of influence between Ramsey (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 8 citations
Frank Ramsey's Anti-Intellectualism.Soroush Marouzi - 2024 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 12 (2):1-32.details Frank Ramsey’s philosophy, developed in the 1920s in Cambridge, was in conversation with the debates surrounding intellectualism in the early twentieth century. Ramsey made his mark on the anti-intellectualist tradition via his notion of habit. He posited that human judgments take shape through habitual processes, and he rejected the separation between the domain of reason, on one hand, and the domain of habit, on the other. Ramsey also provided the ground to explore the nature of knowledge employed in acting from (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Ramsey on judgment: The theory of "facts and propositions".John M. Vickers - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (4):499–516.details Ramsey's “Facts and Propositions” is terse, allusive, and dense. The paper is far from easy to understand. The present essay is an effort, largely following Brian Loar's account,1 to say what Ramsey's goal is, to spell out what he took to be the means to accomplish it, and to show how those means, at least in the terms of F&P, cannot accomplish that end. I also contrast Loar's own account of judgment, explicitly modeled on Ramsey's view, with the latter. The (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
Ramsey's Pragmatic Approach to Truth and Belief.Monika Gruber - 2017 - Theoria 83 (3):225-248.details In spite of his tragically short life, Ramsey made extensive contributions in the fields of mathematics, logic, economics and philosophy. In this article we focus on Ramsey's investigations into the notions of belief and judgement, their truth conditions and probability theory. We show that the central role given by Ramsey to belief and action together with his pragmatism allows for a new interpretation of the theories of truth and probability, paving the way for a modern decision theory. Download Export citation Bookmark
Indexicals and the theory of reference.Stephen Schiffer - 1981 - Synthese 49 (1):43--100.details Download Export citation Bookmark 52 citations

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