People cannot make independent judgements of stimulus attributes and so (Lockhead 1992, p. 551) rather than in terms of stimulus features. The new commentaries here further this statement and also support the observations in the target article that psychophysical scaling methods allow us to measure (1) how context determines judgments and (2) what people remember about prior stimuli.

In contrast to Lockhead's view it is argued that psychology as a genuine science must not be based on other sciences and that psychological measurements have to be validated inside psychology. It is pointed out that psychological scalings, unaffected by judgment contexts, can be obtained if the experimental setting is compatible with everyday situations.

Amidst the progress being made in the various (sub-)disciplines of the behavioural and brain sciences a somewhat neglected subject is the problem of how everything fits into one world and, derivatively, how the relation between different levels of discourse should be understood and to what extent different levels, domains, approaches, or disciplines are autonomous or dependent. In this paper I critically review the most recent proposals to specify the nature of interdiscourse relations, focusing on the concept of supervenience. Ideally supervenience (...) is a relation between different discourses which has all the advantages of reduction, but without its disadvantages. I apply the more abstract considerations to two concrete cases: schizophrenia and colour. Usually an interlevel or interdiscourse relation is seen as asymmetrical: the overlaying discourse depends on the underlying discourse (and not vice versa), where the out- or un-spoken assumption is that the ultimate underlying discourse is physical. Instead I argue that scientific categories referred to in interdiscourse relations are, ultimately, dependent on common sense categories and common sense normative criteria. It is the manifest categories and common sense ideas about what is reasonable and what is right that determine the relevant categorisations at the deeper, underlying levels. I suggest that the implications of this are not merely methodological or epistemological. (shrink)

We present select examples of how visual phenomena can serve as tools to uncoverbrain mechanisms. Specifically, receptive field organization is proposed as a Gestalt-like neural mechanism of perceptual organization. Appropriate phenomena, such as brightness and orientation contrast, subjective contours, filling-in, and aperture-viewed motion, allow for a quantitative comparison between receptive fields and their psychophysical counterparts, perceptive fields. Phenomenology might thus be extended from the study of perceptual qualities to their transphenomenal substrates, including memory functions. In conclusion, classic issues of Gestalt (...) psychology can now be related to modern. (shrink)

Given that psychophysical responses are not a function of a single property but vary with a variety of stimulus and context variables, Lockhead has little hope for laws relating behavior to the environment. However, progress can be made with tasks that manipulate multiple sources of information to test formal information-processing models.

In his target article Lockhead calls attention to numerous complications that prevent a valid straightforward or Fechnerian interpretation of psychophysical data. Here I describe three additional sources of bias, all involving the influence of stimuli presented before the start of an investigation.

Psychophysical scales can be constructed under suitable restrictions from appropriate data, but they still do not justify privileged internal sensations.

Fechner's conception of psychophysics included both “outer psychophysics” the relation between stimulus intensity and the response reflecting sensation strength, and “inner psychophysics” the relation between neurelectric responses and sensation strength. In his own time outer psychophysics focussed on the form of the psychophysical law, with Fechner espousing a logarithmic law, Delboeuf a variant of the logarithmic law incorporating a resting level of neural activity, and Plateau a power law. One of the issues on which the dispute was focussed concerned the (...) appearance of contrasts if the overall illumination was increased or decreased; another issue was the question of whether a sensation of a “just noticeable difference” established for one value of a sensory dimension appeared the same for a value elsewhere on the dimension. The development of “inner psychophysics” led through the works of Delboeuf, Solomons, Jastrow, and Thurstone to modern signal detection theory. A third line of research, devoted to the question of what was meant by the “measurement” of sensation strength, stemmed from the criticism of Fechner's work by von Kries (1882) and others. Although a valid body of science could be built up without the intervening variable called “sensation strength,” such a science might be a cumbersome representation of reality. When an optical contrast is set up, and its overall illumination is increased or decreased, subjective contrasts involving medium levels of lightness vary little as illumination varies (as a power law based on sensation ratios or a logarithmic law based on sensation differences predict), but subjective contrasts involving extreme levels of lightness might be subject to the effects of other variables. (shrink)

[Comment, pp 759-780] Lockhead (1992) [Target Article] is undoubtedly right to attack so-called intensity scaling or the estimation of subjective magnitudes as an invalid perversion of tasks requiring quantitative judgments of aspects of objects, stuffs, and situations. He goes too far, however, in claiming that feature scales do not exist... ... A perceived physical pattern (sensory feature or channel) and the cognitive process that integrates it with its context are characterized by determining to which particular combination of specified stimulus patterns (...) the response is most sensitive. This is the principle of causal system analysis that is at the basis of all theory-building science. (shrink)

In terms of physics, mass is the fixed attribute of an object while weight varies with the accelerative force. Neither weight nor mass are simple sensory stimuli as both involve the integration of sensory and motor information with higher cognitive processes. Studies of apparent heaviness yield only vague information about sensorimotor mechanisms.