Leibniz distinguishes between contingent truths and necessary truths, but many commentators worry that Leibniz's contingent truths are not truly contingent. While scholars who consider Leibniz in the context of his work in the natural sciences often view Leibniz as a forerunner of the theory of contingent truths, scholars who consider his theological views tend to be considerably more concerned about the space for contingent truths in his system. This paper examines Leibniz's theory of contingent truths and shows that there are (...) two distinct and initially unrelated dilemmas that forced the young Leibniz of the 1670s to recognize that not all things are necessary and prompted him to develop an idea of contingency: the first concerned natural laws in natural science and the other his idea of the theodicy. The present paper argues that Leibniz's theory of contingent truths based on the principle of sufficient reason is a solution to the question of the validity of natural laws and does not lead to necessitarianism. However, Leibniz maintains a series of commitments in theology, which push him towards necessitarianism throughout his lifetime. (shrink)

In this article, I take on a classic objection to Kant’s arguments in the Antinomy of Pure Reason: that the arguments are question-begging, as they draw illicit inferences from claims about representation to claims about reality. While extant attempts to vindicate Kant try to show that he does not make such inferences, I attempt to vindicate Kant’s arguments in a different way: I show that, given Kant’s philosophical backdrop, the inferences in question are not illicit. This is because the transcendental (...) realists that Kant was arguing against have certain philosophical commitments about the nature of ground which, if true, warrant the inferences that Kant draws. This historical corrective not only allows us to better understand Kant’s own thinking in the Antinomies but it also has important upshots for our understanding of Kant’s transcendental idealism. (shrink)

Apresento e desenvolvo neste artigo o problema da prova sortuda, analisando duas soluções para ele presentes na literatura. A primeira delas consistira em alegar que mostrar que o predicado está contido no sujeito não basta como demonstração da verdade de uma proposição, sendo preciso que se prove ainda que a noção relativa ao sujeito é logicamente consistente. A segunda repousaria em uma hierarquização modal, por assim dizer, dos pre- dicados integrantes de uma noção individual. Após exibir as razões que me (...) levam a rejeitar essas duas soluções, apresento os traços fundamentais de uma interpretação que me parece resolver o problema de maneira satisfatória. Minha posição envolve conceder ao Princípio da Razão Suficiente um papel central na compreensão do que significa, para Leibniz, provar que um determinado predicado está contido na noção relativa a um certo indivíduo. (shrink)