Switch to: References

Citations of:

Epistemic Feelings are Affective Experiences

Emotion Review 14 (3):206-216 (2022)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.

Value Feelings: A Defense.Hichem Naar - 2023 - Philosophies 8 (4):69.details The goal of this paper is to provide an initial defense of a neglected epistemology of value according to which a fundamental mode of access to evaluative facts and properties is constituted by a distinctive kind of feeling, sometimes called ‘value feeling’. The paper defends the appeal to value feelings against some objections that have been leveled against it, objections intended to show that it is a nonstarter. The paper argues that these objections can be met and that the view (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Affectivism about intuitions.Slawa Loev - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-24.details This article provides an account of intuitions: Affectivism. Affectivism states that intuitions are emotional experiences. The article proceeds as follows: first, the features that intuitions are typically taken to have are introduced. Then some issues with extant theories are outlined. After that, emotional experiences and their central features are brought into view. This is followed by a comparison of intuitions and emotional experiences, yielding the result that emotional experiences fit and elucidate the feature profile of intuitions. Finally, it is specified (...) Download Export citation Bookmark

1