I argue that Hume's naturalistic explanation of religious belief in the Natural History of Religion has significant epistemic consequences. While he argues in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (and in other works) that belief in God is not justified on the basis of testimony or philosophical argument, this is not enough to show that religious belief is not warranted. In the Natural History, Hume provides a genetic explanation for religious belief. I contend that the explanation of religious belief in the (...) Natural History, given Hume's conclusions in his other works, provides grounds to reject religious belief. Thus, I conclude that the Natural History plays an important role in Hume's overall critique of religion insofar as it is a necessary component in Hume's arsenal against the warrant of religious belief. (shrink)

While Hume has often been held to have been an agnostic or atheist, several contemporary scholars have argued that Hume was a theist. These interpretations depend chiefly on several passages in which Hume allegedly confesses to theism. In this paper, I argue against this position by giving a threshold characterization of theism and using it to show that Hume does not confess. His most important confession does not cross this threshold and the ones that do are often expressive rather than (...) assertive. I then argue that Hume is best interpreted as an atheist. Instead of interpreting Hume as a proto-logical positivist and arguing on the basis of Hume’s theories of meaning and method, I show that textually he appears to align himself with atheism, that his arguments in the Dialogues on Natural Religion support atheism, and that this position is most consistent with Hume’s naturalism. But, I hold that his atheism is soft and therefore distinct from that of his peers like Baron d’Holbach—while Hume really does reject theism, he neither embraces a dogmatically materialist position nor takes up a purely polemical stance towards theism. I conclude by suggesting several ways in which Hume’s atheistic philosophy of religion is relevant to contemporary discussions. (shrink)

W niniejszej pracy staram się osłabić gruntowną krytykę Dawida Hume’a dotyczącą „teizmu empirycznego” : a) odróżniam „realizm empiryczny”, który przypisuję Kleantesowi, od „idealizmu empirycznego”, koncepcji, co istotne, nie stwarzającej dodatkowych trudności teoretycznych, oraz b) wykazuję, że jeżeli przez „teizm empiryczny” rozumieć się będzie także to drugie stanowisko, ów teizm okaże się w istocie niepodatny na część zarzutów wysuniętych przez Hume’a.